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Online spaces are being systematically weaponised 
to exclude women leaders and to undermine 
the role of women in public life. Attacks on 
women which use hateful language, rumour and 
gendered stereotypes combine personal attacks 
with political motivations, making online spaces 
dangerous places for women to speak out. And 
left unchecked, this phenomenon of gendered 
disinformation, spread by state and non-state 
actors, poses a serious threat to women’s equal 
political participation.
In this research, we investigated state-aligned 
gendered disinformation in two countries, Poland 
and the Philippines, through an analysis of Twitter 
data. We analysed tweets in Polish and, from 
the Philippines, in English. All Twitter data was 
collected through the platform’s public API. Data 
was collected and analysed as follows:
1. A list of users who heavily influence online 
political discourse in each country was 
assembled, and tweets sent by these accounts 
and a sample of users following them was 
collected.
2. Tweets were filtered to those containing terms 
within a lexicon of political and gendered 
terminology, which was built by in-country 
experts and refined according to language 
discovered in the dataset.
3. The resulting dataset was filtered to identify 
tweets containing a name or phrase associated 
with a likely target of gendered disinformation, 
based on initial analysis and input from in-
country experts. 
4. This data was manually analysed to 
identify which tweets displayed gendered 
disinformation, and the key themes which arose.
5. Finally, the dataset was used to generate 
network maps of which users were sharing 
gendered disinformation, and whether there 
was evidence of state-alignment in those who 
were most engaged in this activity.
In August 2020, a closed roundtable was held by 
NDI with experts from across the world to discuss 
the findings and the ramifications for mitigation 
strategies. 
What did we find?
• Gendered disinformation is being shared by  
state-aligned actors online - though it reaches 
much broader audiences.
• The way in which gendered disinformation 
spreads across a network varies hugely according 
to context.
• But the themes of gendered disinformation - the 
rules that it follows - are often broadly consistent.
• Gendered disinformation is parasitic on news 
events, existing rumours, and underlying social 
stereotypes, and seeks to reshape the terms of 
political discourse in a way that harms women.
• Gendered disinformation plays on existing tropes 
to try to convince people that women in public 
life, are one or more of: devious, stupid, overly 
sexual, in need of protection, or immoral: and so 
unfit for public life.
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
‘Attacks on women which use 
hateful language, rumour and 
gendered stereotypes combine 
personal attacks with political 
motivations, making online 
spaces dangerous places for 
women to speak out.’
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• Gendered disinformation is not just false 
information - it uses highly emotive and value-
laden content to try to undermine its targets.
• Gendered disinformation weaponises harassment 
against women in public life, and tries to make 
them afraid to talk back. 
• But women are speaking up: online 
counterspeech is being used by women in  
public life and their allies to fight back.
What does this mean for the fight against 
disinformation?
• Gendered disinformation should not 
be overlooked in responses to general 
disinformation. Solutions in policy and practice 
must recognise that disinformation takes many 
forms, and can vary what it looks like and where it 
originates according to context.
• Centralised automated solutions to gendered 
disinformation are likely to censor legitimate 
speech and overlook gendered disinformation. 
Input and oversight from local experts who 
understand the language and context in which 
disinformation occurs is vital.
• Solutions should centre and learn from the 
experiences of women who are already working 
to challenge disinformation: the problem 
is a systemic one and targets of gendered 
disinformation should not be expected to fix  
it as individuals. 
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WHAT IS STATE-ALIGNED GENDERED 
DISINFORMATION?
Online spaces are being used to weaponise 
gendered language and narratives about what 
people of different genders should and should not 
do in order to pursue political goals. In this report, 
we focus on gendered disinformation as it affects 
women: not only as it is likely to disproportionately 
affect women, but because of the specific role that 
gendered disinformation plays in the systematic 
exclusion of women from political power. 
‘Gendered disinformation’ refers to information 
activities (creating, sharing, disseminating content) 
which:
• Attacks or undermines people on the basis of 
their gender; 
• Weaponises gendered narratives to promote 
political, social or economic objectives.
Gendered disinformation online exists at the 
intersection of disinformation with online violence, 
such as abuse and harassment: it seeks impact 
primarily at the political level, though can also 
cause serious harm at the personal level.
This online behaviour, as with online violence 
against women in politics, operates on several 
levels to achieve political outcomes: targeting 
individual women to harm them or drive them 
out of public life, while also sending a message 
that women in general should not be involved 
in politics: that it is too risky, too dangerous, 
too unsuitable, too detrimental to a state.1 This 
message is intended for other women who are in 
politics or considering it; but also for the demos 
at large. By playing on existing stereotypes and 
tropes about women, underlying beliefs that 
women simply are not good enough for politics 
are reinforced, with the ultimate aim that women 
self-censor and fail to garner support from voters or 
citizens at large.2  
We sought in this research to investigate state-
aligned gendered disinformation (SAGD), whereby 
actors who are part of a state, or whose behaviour 
or interests align with those of a state, engage 
in gendered disinformation to promote political 
outcomes. Gendered disinformation can be 
deliberate, without being coordinated. We use the 
broad term ‘state-aligned’ to include disinformation 
created and shared not only by those who may 
have been directly coordinated by the government, 
but also by informal networks of actors who use 
gendered disinformation to try to shield the state 
from critique or democratic threat, in particular by 
women in public life.
Such state-aligned gendered disinformation 
has been identified and can be seen in political 
situations across the world: especially that which 
“mixes old ingrained sexist attitudes with the 
anonymity and reach of social media in an effort 
to destroy women’s reputations and push them 
out of public life”.3 These campaigns take multiple 
forms, but with common gendered elements: from 
doctored images claiming to be naked photos of 
women politicians who have spoken out against 
war to fake photos of women journalists which 
purport to show they have had plastic surgery.4,5  
Other examples include screenshots purporting to 
be from women politicians’ sex tapes, harassment 




fabricated content used against prominent women 
of colour who criticise the state leader.6,7,8,9 
KEY FINDINGS: 
We found gendered disinformation being shared 
more often within certain clusters of online Twitter 
users in Poland and the Philippines: notably clusters 
of politically influential people, including those who 
have alignment in some way with the state. 
However, gendered disinformation does not 
always take place within an echo chamber. We 
found that where gendered disinformation is 
shared in a network is very context-dependent: 
in Poland, it was shared at a low level amongst a 
more interconnected network. In the Philippines, 
gendered disinformation was concentrated more in 
one group which had less overlap with other groups 
of users. 
Counterspeech and gendered disinformation are 
often shared by the same groups of people, though 
this speech often takes different, politically-inflected 
forms in different groups. 
Through engaging in online political discourse in 
set ways, whether that is the use of certain words, 
hashtags, tropes or targeting particular people 
and groups, the rules of online political discourse 
itself are re-shaped, into a language game which 
excludes women as full, active and respected 
members. 
It is through this lens that we present six ‘rules’: 
these are patterns we consistently observed in this 
research in how women in public life were attacked 
and spoken about, and gendered narratives which 
were being manipulated by state-aligned actors 
and their networks. We focused on Poland and the 
Philippines specifically, but these rules have echoes 
globally in the kinds of abuse women are subjected 
to and the narratives which authoritarian leaders 
aim to promote to consolidate their own power and 
political agendas. 
These rules are:
RULE 1  
Convince others that women are devious:  
they are not fit for politics
A central narrative in gendered disinformation is 
that women are not fit for public or private political 
lives, and as such, should be excluded. Most 
frequently, this language surrounds their character: 
as presented through gendered disinformation, 
women are devious, unreliable and fake. 
RULE 2  
Denounce women as too stupid for public life
Through a mix of cited pseudoscience, old-
fashioned ‘humour’ and general abuse, the 
stupidity of women was a regular topic of gendered 
disinformation in the datasets we examined.
RULE 3  
Make women afraid to talk back
Over the past five years, platforms have made 
changes aimed at improving the experience of 
vulnerable users, though targeting of women in 
coordinated online abuse continues today. Women 
calling out this harrassment, or using tools to 
reduce it through blocking or muting accounts, was 
often mentioned in abuse. On top of this, platform 
decisions seen to be protecting women were also 
decried.
RULE 4 
Praise women for being sexy, condemn  
them for being sexual
Sexualised distortion is common in disinformation 
campaigns against women - from sharing doctored 
photos of women politicians naked, to screenshots 
purporting to be from sex tapes, to accusations of 
illicit affairs. The power of these tactics comes from 
social norms which pervade about women and their 
sexuality - from the ‘virgin’ archetype that women 
should remain pure, to the ‘whore’ - that women are 
obscenely sexual and will use their sexuality to get 
what they want.
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‘These rules have echoes globally 
in the kinds of abuse women are 
subjected to and the narratives 
which authoritarian leaders aim to 
promote to consolidate their own 
power and political agendas.’
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RULE 5: 
Show everyone that the strong men will  
save them 
The character of strongmen in politics is making 
a comeback. These ‘strong men’ demonstrate 
similarities in their attitudes towards women. When 
women try to reclaim their power or raise their 
voice, they see it as a challenge to their rule as well. 
Hence they encourage an undermining discourse 
towards women and other genders, to support 
their policies such as banning abortion, their anti-
LGBT sentiments and their ideas on where women 
belong. 
RULE 6: 
Demonise the values that women hold
The amalgamation of Left-wing politics and 
feminist politics was a central feature of gendered 
disinformation explored by this research. By eliding 
the two, conservative or Right-wing governments 
such as those investigated portray feminism as anti-
governmental and oppositional. 
Overall, we found that the ways that those who 
engage in gendered disinformation act can be 
characterised as follows:
THEY USE EMOTIONS, NOT FACTS: The clearest 
commonality between the stories told about 
women in public life described above is that they 
seek to inflame people’s emotions, in addition to 
spreading false information about their targets.
THEY TARGET WOMEN, CONVERT THEIR ALLIES, 
BOLSTER THEIR CRITICS: The messages work to 
engender anger, disgust and disdain in the third 
party reader; and fear and shame in the second 
person target.
THEY USE IN-JOKES: Specific phrases or terms are 
used in online discourse by communities engaging 
in SAGD to denigrate a particular woman or make 
reference to a particular event, which might not be 
immediately obvious to an outside observer. 
THEY MAKE THE NEWS - THEN USE THE NEWS: 
Abuse or offensive comments made by political 
leaders become a discussion point in themselves 
which lead to repetition online
THEY ARE PARASITIC: Disinformation relies on 
co-opting underlying values, beliefs and ways of 
speaking to get its message across, rather than 
trying to invent something completely new.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We need systematic improvements to be made to 
how platforms operate in facilitating, promoting 
and moderating online speech, and how policy  
and practice respond to these problems. We 
present the challenges of existing solutions to  
these problems, and criteria that effective  
solutions must meet. 
RECOGNISE THE DIVERSITY OF 
DISINFORMATION: Disinformation takes many 
forms and is engaged in and perpetuated by many 
different actors: a ‘one-size fits-all’ approach will 
not be successful. Fact-checking, while important in 
the fight against disinformation, is not a panacea, 
as emotional content and value-judgements play 
a major role in gendered disinformation. Similarly, 
focusing on formal networks risks overlooking the 
informal networks that are implicated in gendered 
disinformation: the political influencers and their 
followings. 
NOT JUST A ‘GENDER’ PROBLEM: Tackling 
gendered disinformation should not be the sole 
purview of gender-based programming: broader 
responses to online harms, analysis of information 
operations, or improvements to platform design 
and oversight, should take into account the 
ramifications for the spread or encouragement of 
gendered disinformation. 
CENTRE LOCAL EXPERTISE: How gendered 
disinformation is framed and spreads across 
a network varies greatly according to context. 
Platforms should support the work of local 
experts in identifying and combating gendered 
disinformation, for instance through the provision 
of data access or the trialling of potential responses 
through changes to platform design. Automated 
systems for identifying gendered disinformation are 
unlikely to have high levels of accuracy - though if 
employed, should be employed transparently and 
overseen by local experts. 
ELEVATE WOMEN’S VOICES: Solutions should 
be co-created with people who have experienced 
being the targets of gendered disinformation, to 
ensure that the most significant threats are being 
addressed in a way that does not compound the 
problem. 
In a post-truth era worries about disinformation 
have become commonplace: from claims of 
“fake news” levelled at everyone from blogs 
and social media accounts to mainstream media 
organisations, to the mainstreaming of conspiracy 
theorists and the exploitation of online spaces 
by state and non-state actors. The common 
conception of what it even is for something to be 
true is under attack.
But disinformation does not affect everyone equally. 
Women in public life are on the frontlines facing the 
weaponisation of information spaces against them. 
Online threats, libellous claims, doctored explicit 
images, vitriolic abuse and harassment: all attempts 
to disempower women, bolster support for political 
attacks on them, and destabilize their critiques, 
particularly of powerful men. 
This report investigates the rules that state-aligned 
actors are following in their attacks on women 
in public life; and how women are fighting back. 
We examine the content that is being shared; 
the platforms which are involved; and the actors 
who engage in gendered disinformation. We 
also present a methodology, co-created with 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) - which 
commissioned this study - for examining state-
aligned gendered disinformation (SAGD) online.
First, we take a deep-dive into the concept of 
‘gendered disinformation’, examining what it 
means and how it relates to disinformation more 
generally and harassment. We build on work by 
the NDI and others to understand the ways in 
which gender norms are manipulated and utilized 
in disinformation campaigns to influence political 
views and outcomes. (Understanding Gendered 
Disinformation, page 11). 
We then present the background for this research, 
including context around gender and politics in 
the two countries we have looked at for this report, 
Poland and the Philippines (Background, page 16). 
We also characterise the users involved - those 
who are engaging in sharing content relevant 
to gendered disinformation, and where state-
alignment is present in the relevant online actors, 
through network maps of how they relate to each 
other (The Players, page 19).
We outline six Rules: the methods and aims of 
gendered disinformation found in our study, and 
characterise the ways they use content to reduce 
women’s participation in political, public and social 
life (The Rules of the Game, page 25). We present 
our conclusions about the overarching aims and 
methods of gendered disinformation (Conclusions, 
page 37). 
We examine how other platforms are connected 
to or reflect the gendered disinformation we were 
seeing on Twitter, and examine their profiles and 
relative influence online of relevant users (The 
Gendered Disinformation Ecosystem, page 35). 
We then examine counterspeech in the Philippines 
as a particular instance of where women and others 
are calling out these attempts and speaking up 
against harassment and abuse (Talking Back and 
Speaking Up, page 33).
Finally, we discuss the ramifications for responding 
to gendered disinformation, and outline the criteria 
which successful responses must meet. (Reclaiming 
the Game, page 39)
We lay out our full network analysis and 
methodology in the Appendices (see separate 
document). We also consider the successes and 
limitations of the methods we used, and how they 
could be refined in future (Limitations, Challenges 
and Methodology Recommendations). 
INTRODUCTION
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WHAT IS GENDERED DISINFORMATION?
Actors engage in information operations, such as 
disinformation, when they coordinate to covertly 
use information insincerely to achieve political, 
social or economic goals.10 
Our understanding of ‘information’ is broad, 
and includes content which may not make clear 
assertions but nevertheless communicates or 
expresses claims. As we showed in our report 
Warring Songs, disinformation can include emotive 
or value-laden content rather than merely fact 
claims.  We identified four main strategies used by 
information operators: to change what information 
is seen by others; to obfuscate the spaces in which 
information is shared; to engender sympathy 
for their cause; and to limit the participation of 
opposing voices in these spaces. Central to online 
disinformation campaigns is the weaponisation of 
online spaces for political purposes - not necessarily 
only the proliferation of falsities.11  
Here we explore a form which information 
operations can and do take, which demonstrate 
these strategies - that is, using online spaces to 
weaponise gendered language and narratives 
about what people of different genders should and 
should not do in order to pursue political goals. In 
this report, we focus on gendered disinformation 
as it affects women: not only as it is likely to 
disproportionately affect women, but because of 
the specific role that gendered disinformation plays 
11




in the systematic exclusion of women from  
political power. 
Gendered disinformation online exists at the 
intersection of disinformation with online violence, 
such as abuse and harassment: it seeks impact 
primarily at the political level, though can also 
cause serious harm at the personal level. Essentially 
it consists in the weaponisation of rumour and 
stereotypes: with false, misleading or hateful 
narratives told, often in abusive language, in order 
to achieve a political impact. 
Gendered disinformation, as with violence against 
women online, is also likely to affect different 
groups of women in different ways, and “[target] 
one or more aspects of a woman’s identity  
‘Gendered disinformation online exists 
at the intersection of disinformation 
with online violence, such as abuse and 
harassment: it seeks impact primarily 
at the political level, though can also 
cause serious harm at the personal level. 
Essentially it consists in the weaponisation 
of rumour and stereotypes: with false, 
misleading or hateful narratives told, 
often in abusive language, in order to 
achieve a political impact.‘ 
 
10.  Krasodomski-Jones, A. and others. Warring Songs: Information Operations in the Digital Age. Demos, 2019, pp. 11-13.  
Available at https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Warring-Songs-final-1.pdf [accessed 03 May 2020]
11.  Thanks to participants at a closed roundtable for their valuable discussion of this topic. 
(e.g., racism, transphobia, etc.,)”, overlapping, for 
instance, with racist disinformation when women of 
colour are the targets.12 
Forms of “information disorder” online are 
often categorised into discrete categories - such 
as disinformation, where false information is 
deliberately created and spread; misinformation, 
where false or misleading information spreads, 
and malinformation, where harassment or abuse is 
used for political purposes.13 All of these categories 
can be identified in gendered content online - in 
particular, the extent of gendered harassment and 
abuse online is well documented.14  Work by the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) found that 
online violence against women in politics could be 
categorised in a way analagous to violence against 
women in politics (VAW-P), as involving: insults and 
hate speech; embarassment and reputational risk; 
physical threats; and sexualised distortion. These 
categories were used as the foundation for some of 
our analysis for this report.15  
However, the complexity of gendered information 
online is such that frequently gendered harassment 
and abuse cannot be separated from the promotion 
of false information about its target; that gendered 
misinformation, even if spread without the 
knowledge that it is false, can also be abusive and 
have political intentions and contribute to a toxic 
online environment; and that fabricated information 
gains traction by appealing to pre-existing 
gendered norms to become common parlance. 
As such, drawing these tight distinctions risks 
excluding the complexity of gendered information 
online. 
As such, we use ‘gendered disinformation’ as an 
umbrella term and present the following working 
definition: 
‘Gendered disinformation’ refers to information 
activities (creating, sharing, disseminating content) 
which:
• Attacks or undermines people on the basis of 
their gender; 
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• Weaponises gendered narratives to promote 
political, social or economic objectives.
Gendered disinformation should be understood 
as a pattern, much like violence against women in 
politics more generally. “One sexist insult might 
be discounted as bad behavior, however, when 
women attempting to engage in political discourse 
face a constant stream of harassment and abuse, 
this becomes violence.”16 Hence excluded from 
gendered disinformation are sincere individual 
expressions of gendered political views or critiques 
of women in politics which are not weaponised to 
attack women or reinforce a wider campaign to  
do so. 
We believe this is crucial to distinguish, as otherwise 
legitimate criticism of gendered disinformation 
may be rebutted as simply trying to ‘silence 
distasteful opinions’, and to identify criticism of 
women or women in public life per se as gendered 
disinformation would be to caricature all women in 
public life as beyond any legitimate or democratic 
critique. This line may not always be easy to draw, 
but the manner of a criticism being expressed, the 
intended and actual effect, the presence of covert 
political, economic or social motives, and the 
wider narratives it invokes or reinforces which all 
count towards identifying something as gendered 
disinformation specifically.   
This online behaviour, as with online violence 
against women in politics, operates on several 
levels to achieve political outcomes: targeting 
individual women to harm them or drive them 
out of public life, while also sending a message 
that women in general should not be involved 
in politics: that it is too risky, too dangerous, 
too unsuitable, too detrimental to a state.17 This 
message is intended for other women who are in 
politics or considering it; but also for the demos 
at large. By playing on existing stereotypes and 
tropes about women, underlying beliefs that 
women simply are not good enough for politics 
are reinforced, with the ultimate aim that women 
self-censor and fail to garner support from voters or 
citizens at large.18  
12.  Amnesty International. Toxic Twitter - Women’s Experiences of Violence and Abuse on Twitter, Chapter 3. 2018. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-chapter-3/ [accessed 15 May 20]
13.  Wardle, C. and Derakshan, H. Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework
 for research and policy making. Council of Europe, 2017. Available at https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-
researc/168076277c [accessed 03 May 2020]
14.  Amnesty International. Toxic Twitter. Amnesty International, 2018. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-
chapter-1/ [accessed 03 May 2020]
15.  Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 2019. Available at 
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 2020]
16.  National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost - A Call to Action. NDI, 2016, p. 14. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1%20%23NotTheCost%20-%20
Call%20to%20Action.pdf [accessed July 2020]
17. National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost - A Call to Action. NDI, 2016. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1%20%23NotTheCost%20-%20Call%20
to%20Action.pdf [accessed July 2020]
18.  National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost - A Call to Action. NDI, 2016. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1%20%23NotTheCost%20-%20Call%20
to%20Action.pdf [accessed July 2020]
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THE IMPACT OF GENDERED DISINFORMATION: 
FROM THE PERSONAL TO THE POLITICAL
‘Online violence against politically-active 
women is one form of the global problem of 
violence against women in politics (VAW-P), 
which encompasses all forms of aggression, 
coercion, and intimidation of politically-active 
women simply because they are women.’ 19
NDI, Tweets that Chill
Gendered online violence can have significant 
political effects, from silencing women in public 
discourse to reducing women’s participation in 
politics and public life, to seemingly justifying the 
political persecution of women. NDI’s 2019 research 
in Kenya, Indonesia and Colombia found that 
Online VAW-P had a ‘chilling effect’ on politically-
active women’s social media engagement, driving 
them to reduce the frequency of their online 
engagement in political discourse or driving them 
away from social media platforms entirely.120 76% of 
women polled by Amnesty who had experienced 
online abuse or harassment reported changing the 
way they use social media platforms as a result; with 
32% stopping posting certain opinions as a result. 
And a survey by Media Matters for Democracy 
found that 9 out of 10 women journalists who 
responded said that online violence affects their 
professional choices, and 8 in 10 said it led to self-
censorship.21 Women are not only discouraged from 
running for office, engaging online or speaking up 
- attacks aimed to discredit them have been used 
to garner support for critics of state leaders being 
arrested, put on trial and even imprisoned.22,23,24  
The personal psychological impact is also 
significant. Research by Amnesty found that over 
half of women polled who had experienced online 
abuse or harassment suffered afterwards from 
stress, anxiety or panic attacks (55%) to trouble 
sleeping (63%) to lower self esteem (61%), and 41% 
feeling their physical safety was threatened on at 
least one occasion.25,26       
Online violence being targeted particularly at 
women politicians and women in public life is a 
widely recognised phenomenon, in a context of 
widespread psychological and physical violence 
against women in public life.27  Political abuse 
occurs widely against politicians of all genders; 
however, a survey of UK MPs found that personal 
attacks and violent threats were much more 
commonly suffered by women.28 Women of colour 
in public life in particular are extremely often 
affected.29 Disproportionate attacks on women 
politicians across Europe have been described 
as seeking to “target, abuse and humiliate” 30, 
focusing on women’s physical appearance, making 
threats and using misogynistic language. 41.8% of 
global women parliamentarian survey respondents 
report sexual or humiliating images having been 
spread online.31  
False and manipulated information can be and is 
used against people of other genders. This too 
can carry significant risk and harm to an individual. 
‘Gendered online violence can have 
significant political effects, from silencing 
women in public discourse to reducing 
women’s participation in politics and 
public life, to seemingly justifying the 
political persecution of women.’
19.  Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 2019. Available at 
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 20]
20.  Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 2019. Available at 
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 20]
21.  Kamran, H. Hostile Bytes. Media Matters for Democracy, 2019. Available at http://www.digitalrightsmonitor.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Hostile-Bytes.pdf [accessed 
24 August 2020] via edia Matters for Democracy. Media Matters for Democracy expresses solidarity with women journalists and calls for an end to all kinds of online 
violence. APC, 2020. Available at https://www.apc.org/en/news/media-matters-democracy-expresses-solidarity-women-journalists-and-calls-end-all-kinds-online 
[accessed 24 August 2020]
22. Jancowicz, N. How Disinformation Became a New Threat to Women. Coda, 2017. Available at https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-a-
new-threat-to-women/ [accessed 03 May 20]
23.   Occeñola, P. Fake News, Real Women: Disinformation Gone Macho. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-disinformation-
gone-macho [accessed 03 May 2020]
24.  Perraudin, F. and Murphy, S. Alarm over number of female MPs stepping down after abuse. Guardian, 2019. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/
oct/31/alarm-over-number-female-mps-stepping-down-after-abuse [accessed 15 May 20]
25. Amnesty International. Amnesty reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women. Amnesty International, 2017. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-online-abuse-against-women/ [accessed 03 May 2020] 
26.  Amnesty International. Amnesty reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women. Amnesty International, 2017. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-online-abuse-against-women/ [accessed 03 May 2020] 
27.  National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost: Stopping Violence Against Women In Politics. Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
2018. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Submission.pdf [accessed 03 May 20]
28.  Akhtar, S. and Morrison, C. The prevalence and impact of online trolling in UK Members of Parliament. Computers in Human Behaviour 99, 2019. 10.1016/j.
chb.2019.05.015 in Shahani, A. Trolled Online, Women In Politics Fight To Hold Big Tech Accountable In The U.K. NPR, 2019. Available at https://www.npr.
org/2019/08/19/751794126/trolled-online-women-in-politics-fight-to-hold-big-tech-accountable-in-the-u-k?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_
term=nprnews&utm_campaign=npr [accessed 03 May 20]
29.  Amnesty International UK. Black and Asian women MPs abused more online. 2017. Available at https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-violence-women-mps [accessed 15 
May 2020]
30.  Guerin, C. in Spring, M. and Webster, L. A web of abuse: How the far right disproportionately targets female politicians, BBC, 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/amp/blogs-trending-48871400?__twitter_impression=true [accessed 03 May 2020]
31.  Di Meco, L. Gendered Disinformation, Fake News, and Women in Politics. Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. Available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/gendered-
disinformation-fake-news-and-women-politics [accessed 03 May 2020] 
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The risks of gendered disinformation run beyond 
disrupting people’s political life to their personal 
liberty and safety. Men attacked by disinformation, 
which may have gendered elements, for instance by 
being accused of being gay in some countries, can 
be put at great risk.32  
However, we focus on gendered disinformation 
which weaponises gendered narratives with 
the purpose being to “control, limit or prevent 
women’s full and equal political participation”.33  
The individual target of such campaigns is 
disproportionately (though not necessarily) a 
woman, as with political online violence against 
women, which seeks not only to target an individual 
but to make a general point to other observers, 
women and non-women: that women should not be 
involved in political life.34  
IDENTIFYING STATE-ALIGNED GENDERED 
DISINFORMATION
We focus in this report on such politically motivated 
gendered disinformation: and specifically state-
aligned gendered disinformation (SAGD): whereby 
actors who are part of a state, or whose behaviour 
or interests align with those of a state, engage 
in gendered disinformation to promote political 
outcomes. 
Such gendered disinformation specifically has been 
identified and can be seen in political situations 
across the world: especially that which “mixes 
old ingrained sexist attitudes with the anonymity 
and reach of social media in an effort to destroy 
women’s reputations and push them out of public 
life”.35 Often this manifests as a state or state-
aligned actors using gendered disinformation 
to advance their own political goals, often to 
undermine their critics and bolster support within 
the state, rather than reach an international 
audience.36 These campaigns take multiple forms, 
but with common gendered elements: from 
doctored images claiming to be naked photos of 
women politicians who have spoken out against 
war to fake photos of women journalists which 
purport to show they have had plastic surgery.37,38   
Other examples include screenshots purporting to 
be from women politicians’ sex tapes, harassment 
campaigns by troll armies, and misleading or 
fabricated content used against prominent women 
of colour who criticise the state leader.39,40,41,42  
Identifying state-based gendered disinformation 
operations - that is, deliberate disinformation 
campaigns, coordinated by state actors - faces 
many challenges, in particular, demonstrating 
coordination and inauthenticity of content, rather 
than, for instance, many users sharing a similar 
message which they genuinely believe which 
so happens to align with the state’s interests. 
Gendered disinformation can, however, be 
deliberate, without being coordinated. We use the 
broad term ‘state-aligned’ to include disinformation 
created and shared not only by those who may 
have been directly coordinated by the government, 
but also by informal networks of actors who use 
gendered disinformation to try to shield the state 
from critique or democratic threat, in particular by 
women in public life.
Challenges still remain of how to identify covert 
motives in sharing false information or critique, 
and how to distinguish specifically state-aligned 
gendered disinformation from more general online 
violence against women in public life. In this 
32.  Jancowicz, N. How Disinformation Became a New Threat to Women. Coda, 2017. Available at https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-
a-new-threat-to-women/ [accessed 03 May 20]
33. National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost - A Call to Action. NDI, 2016. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1%20%23NotTheCost%20-%20Call%20
to%20Action.pdf [accessed July 2020]
34.  National Democratic Institute. #NotTheCost - A Call to Action. NDI, 2016. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1%20%23NotTheCost%20-%20Call%20
to%20Action.pdf [accessed July 2020]
35. Jancowicz, N. How Disinformation Became a New Threat to Women. Coda, 2017. Available at https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-
a-new-threat-to-women/ [accessed 03 May 2020]
36.  Thanks to participants of the roundtable for raising this point. August, 2020. 
37.   Jancowicz, N. How Disinformation Became a New Threat to Women. Coda, 2017. Available at https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-
a-new-threat-to-women/ [accessed 03 May 2020]
38.  Occeñola, P. Fake News, Real Women: Disinformation Gone Macho. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-disinformation-
gone-macho [accessed 03 May 2020]
39.   Jancowicz, N. How Disinformation Became a New Threat to Women. Coda, 2017. Available at https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/how-disinformation-became-
a-new-threat-to-women/ [accessed 03 May 2020]
40.  Occeñola, P. Fake News, Real Women: Disinformation Gone Macho. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-disinformation-
gone-macho [accessed 03 May 2020]
41.  Posetti, J. Fighting back against prolific online harassment in the Philippines. The Conversation, 2017. Available at https://theconversation.com/fighting-back-against-
prolific-online-harassment-in-the-philippines-80271 [accessed 03 May 2020]
42.  Holmes, J. A Cop’s Threat Against Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Shows Propaganda Is Dangerous. Esquire, 2019. Available at https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/
a28479868/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-police-officer-threat-misinformation/ [accessed 03 May 2020]
‘State-aligned gendered disinformation 
(SAGD): whereby actors who are part of 
a state, or whose behaviour or interests 
align with those of a state, engage in 
gendered disinformation to promote 
political outcomes.‘
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report, we have approached these challenges in 
several ways; looking at content targeting people 
in public life who are likely targets of gendered 
disinformation and identifying discussion of 
known instances of disinformation (based on our 
background review, input from in-country experts 
and initial examination of the data); looking at 
politically influential users, many of whom work for 
the government or are aligned with the state; and 
looking at their friends and followers to examine 
the information networks within which these users 
are operating, as well as identifying commonalities 
between tweets shared. 
Not all of the examples of gendered disinformation 
we describe in this report come from state-aligned 
actors (though that is our primary focus): some 
are even from those explicitly aligned against the 
state. We discuss the makeup of different groups 
sharing gendered disinformation in The Players. 
This allows us to present a fuller picture of how 
online discourse about women is weaponised by 
state-aligned actors, and examine the overlaps and 
interactions between state-aligned and other forms 
of gendered disinformation.
Another aim of this project was to test how effective 
our methodology was for investigating state-
aligned disinformation of a particular type, and 
whether this method could be refined and widely 
implemented around areas, topics or events of 
particular interest.
We do not thus present a conclusive analysis of 
state-driven gendered disinformation campaigns 
- we do, however, offer a snapshot of the kind of 
gendered online discourse, driven by state-aligned 
actors, that is targeting women in public life. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND
This study looks at how state-aligned gendered 
disinformation occurs in an online ecosystem in 
two countries, primarily through the examination 
of Twitter data. We examined tweets sent by users, 
many of whom were aligned with or influential 
within the state through their work, connections 
or social position, and who were identified by in-
country experts as particularly influential in online 
political discourse. We then looked in particular 
at tweets which used language associated with 
gendered disinformation and which named likely 
targets of gendered disinformation, in order to 
examine how gendered disinformation manifested 
in online conversations.
METHOD OUTLINE
Working with the National Democratic Institute, 
we identified two ‘trial’ countries to investigate: 
Poland and the Philippines. These countries were 
selected based on: the prevalence of disinformation 
and/or gendered abuse; political attitudes towards 
gendered issues; levels of online political discourse 
across different platforms; where there were strong 
connections with in-country partners to guide the 
analysis; and language capabilities of the research 
team. We analysed tweets in Polish and, from the 
Philippines, in English. All Twitter data was collected 
through the platform’s public API.
Data was collected and analysed as follows:
1. A list of users who heavily influence online 
political discourse in each country was 
assembled, and tweets sent by these accounts 
and a sample of users following them was 
collected.
2. Tweets were filtered to those containing terms 
within a lexicon of political and gendered 
terminology, which was built by in-country 
experts and refined according to language 
discovered in the dataset
3. The resulting dataset was filtered to identify 
tweets containing a name or phrase associated 
with a likely target of gendered disinformation, 
based on initial analysis and input from in-
country experts. 
4. This data was manually analysed to 
identify which tweets displayed gendered 
disinformation, and the key themes which arose.
5. Finally, the dataset was used to generate 
network maps of which users were sharing 
gendered disinformation, and whether there 
was evidence of state-alignment in those who 
were most engaged in this activity.
This project was commenced in August 2019 and 
completed in August 2020. 
In August 2020, a closed roundtable was held by 
NDI with experts from across the world to discuss 
the findings and the ramifications for mitigation 
strategies. 
More details can be found in the Full Methodology, 
and recommendations for refining the methodology 




The conservative nationalist Law and Justice Party 
(PiS), who governed the country since 2015, won 
the general election in October 2019.43 Since 
then, the government and the Prime Minister 
Mateusz Morawiecki have been criticized by 
many national and international liberal voices 
for increasing control over public media and 
introducing repressive policies, many of which 
disproportionately impact women. Abortion rights, 
‘leftist’ feminism and LGBT rights have all been 
43.  BBC. Poland election: Ruling Law and Justice Party win poll. 14 October 2019.  
Available at  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50037654 [accessed 15 May 2020]
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contested by the governing party.44,45,46,47 Human 
Rights Watch have criticised the government’s 
attitudes towards women’s rights activists in Poland, 
on the basis that they were48 denying funding for 
women rights charities, advocating for regressive 
laws and reinforcing traditional gender roles.49  
Although the use of Twitter in Poland is not high, 
nevertheless, Twitter has been described by the 
Stanford Internet Observatory as a place where the 
terms of political and media debate are set due 
to its use by political and media figures.50  Online 
disinformation and misinformation are widespread 
in Poland, particularly relating to the rights of 
LGBT+ people and of immigrants and refugees.51   
Coordinated campaigns to spread far-right content 
have been identified, and a coordinated online 
harassment campaign against members of the 
judiciary who had criticised government policies 
even led to the resignation of a government deputy 
minister.52,53 Communication firms and troll farms 
engage in astroturfing and attacking political 
opponents, both of the right and the left: though 
an Oxford Internet Institute report examining likely 
fake accounts identified twice as many suspicious 
right-wing as left-wing accounts.54 
The Philippines
Rodrigo Duterte was elected President of the 
Philippines in 2016. Previously the Mayor of Davao, 
he is known - and is popular domestically for 
his hardline approach to crime, particularly drug 
crime.55 In the May 2019 elections, his position 
was strengthened as his allies took control of the 
senate.56,57 Human rights in the Philippines is an 
issue of international concern.58 The police and 
security forces, as well as unidentified gunmen, 
have been involved in thousands of extra-
judicial killings relating to the ‘war on drugs’.59,60  
Critics of Duterte and his ‘drug war’, including 
politicians, journalists and activists, have faced 
trolling, harassment, attacks, arrest, lawsuits, and 
detention.61 Public denunciation is seen as “part of 
the Duterte style of rule”62. Duterte is known for his 
‘strongman’ approach - as well as for his offensive 
and misogynistic behaviour, including making sexist 
jokes, making jokes about rape, and attempting to 
kiss women while on official visits.63 
The weaponisation of social media by the 
government and its supporters is well  
documented 64 - for instance, through “patriotic 
trolling”, where genuine users and paid employees 
44.  Shukla, S and Klosok, A. Poland debates abortion bill amid coronavirus lockdown. CNN News, 16 April 2020. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/15/world/
poland-abortion-law-intl/index.html [accessed 15 May 2020]
45.  Zbytniewska, K. Polish activist: Nothing is right about women’s rights in Poland. Euroactiv, 2018. Available at 
 https://wZbytniewska, K. Polish activist: Nothing is right about women’s rights in Poland. Euroactiv, 2018. Available at 
 https://www.euractiv.com/section/freedom-of-thought/news/polish-activist-nothing-is-right-about-womens-rights-in-poland/ [accessed 14 May 2020]
47.  Easton, A. Polish election: Leader targets gay rights as threat to society. BBC News, 8 October 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49904849 
[accessed 14 April 2020]
48.  Human Rights Watch. ‘The Breath of the Government on My Back’. Attacks on Women’s Rights in Poland. Human Rights Watch, 2019 Available at https://www.hrw.org/
report/2019/02/06/breath-government-my-back/attacks-womens-rights-poland [accessed 12 March 2020]
49.  Human Rights Watch. ‘The Breath of the Government on My Back’. Attacks on Women’s Rights in Poland. Human Rights Watch, 2019 Available at https://www.hrw.org/
report/2019/02/06/breath-government-my-back/attacks-womens-rights-poland [accessed 12 March 2020]
50.  Bush, D. and Kurzynski, M. Poland: Presidential Election 2020 Scene-Setter. Stanford Internet Observatory, 2020. Available at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/
poland-scene-setter [accessed 26 August 2020]
51. Bush, D. and Kurzynski, M. Poland: Presidential Election 2020 Scene-Setter. Stanford Internet Observatory, 2020. Available at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/
poland-scene-setter [accessed 26 August 2020]
52. Bush, D. and Kurzynski, M. Poland: Presidential Election 2020 Scene-Setter. Stanford Internet Observatory, 2020. Available at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/
poland-scene-setter [accessed 26 August 2020]
53.  Gałczyńska, M. Śledztwo Onetu. Farma trolli w Ministerstwie Sprawiedliwości, czyli “za czynienie dobra nie wsadzamy”. Onet, 2019. Available at https://wiadomosci.
onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/sledztwo-onetu-farma-trolli-w-ministerstwie-sprawiedliwosci-czyli-za-czynienie-dobra/j6hwp7f [accessed 26 August 2020]
54.  Jancowicz, N. The Growing Threat of Domestic Disinformation in Poland. Center for a New American Security, 2020. Available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/
commentary/the-growing-threat-of-domestic-disinformation-in-poland [accessed 26 August 2020]
55.  BBC News. Profile: Duterte the controversial ‘strongman’ of the Philippines. BBC News, 22 May 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-36659258 
[accessed 12 March 2020]
56.  BBC News. ‘Philippine mid-terms: Duterte consolidates grip on power.’ BBC News, 22 May 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48277482. 
[accessed 12 March 2020]
57.  Esmaquel II, P. ‘Duterte allies named dominant majority, minority parties’. Rappler, 10 May 2019. Available at https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/
elections/2019/230157-duterte-allies-named-dominant-majority-minority-parties [accessed 12 March 2020]
58.  Human Rights Watch. Philippines: UN Takes Critical Step Toward Accountability, 2019. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/11/philippines-un-takes-critical-
step-toward-accountability [accessed 15 May 2020]
59.  Human Rights Watch. Philippines Events 2018. Human Rights Watch, 2019. Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/philippines  [accessed 
12 March 2020]
60.  Timberman, D. Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. Available at https://carnegieendowment.
org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091 [accessed 12 March 2020]
61.  Human Rights Watch. Philippines Events 2018. Human Rights Watch, 2019. Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/philippines  [accessed 
12 March 2020]
62.  Timberman, D. Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. Available at https://carnegieendowment.
org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091 [accessed 12 March 2020]
63.  Occenola, P. ‘Fake News , Real Women: Disinformation gone Macho’. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-disinformation-
gone-macho [accessed 10 March 2020]
64.  Timberman, D. Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. Available at https://carnegieendowment.
org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091 [accessed 12 March 2020]
18
boost government narratives online, across 
multiple platforms.65 The news organisation 
Rappler has collected a database of 12 million 
accounts which post or share disinformation or pro-
Duterte material.66 The structures of “networked 
disinformation” in the Philippines are more diverse 
and in some cases informal than in other countries, 
ranging from professional strategists to online 
influencers to fake account operators to grassroots 
volunteers, including a lot of freelancers.67 We saw 
this reflected in our examination of user profiles 
(see The Players).
This report contains quotes of hate speech and 
harmful speech, including descriptions of sexual  
and gender-based violence. 
Where a quote from Twitter could be used to 
identify an individual user, the quote has been 
modified to preserve the sense but not the exact 
words used.
65.  Etter, L. ‘What Happens When the Government Uses Facebook as a Weapon?’ Bloomberg News, 2017. Available at 
 ‘https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebook-into-a-weapon-with-a-little-help-from-facebook [accessed 12 March 2020]
66.  Etter, L. ‘What Happens When the Government Uses Facebook as a Weapon?’ Bloomberg News, 2017. Available at 
 ‘https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebook-into-a-weapon-with-a-little-help-from-facebook [accessed 12 March 2020]
67.  Corpus Ong, J. and Cabanes, J.V. Architects of Networked Disinformation. University of Leeds, 2018. Available at http://newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/ARCHITECTS-OF-NETWORKED-DISINFORMATION-FULL-REPORT.pdf [accessed 12 March 2020]
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CHAPTER 3  
THE PLAYERS
We first present a topline analysis of the networks 
of people online whose online activity we examined 
to identify state-aligned gendered disinformation 
(SAGD) in the Philippines and Poland. The majority 
of gendered disinformation we examined in our 
research was state-aligned in content - that is, 
aligned with state interests, attacking critics of the 
state and so forth (see more in The Rules Of The 
Game). Through this network analysis, we also 
demonstrate that there is credible evidence of the 
users who are creating or sharing this gendered 
disinformation being state-aligned, giving more 
weight to its identification as SAGD specifically. 
To select whose online activity we would focus on, 
advised by the in-country experts in the Philippines 
and Poland, we located prominent political and 
cultural leaders, most of whom were aligned with 
the state in some way either through their official 
position or through their alignment of opinions. 
These were our ‘key users’. We collected tweets 
from them, from their friends and from a random 
10% sample of their followers. These tweets 
produced the dataset which we used for our 
qualitative analysis (The Rules Of The Game). 
‘Social feeds are not a neutral ordering of information.‘
Key terms: 
• User: An individual or organisation who has  
a Twitter account
• Key user: Those individuals who were identified 
as of particular interest to political discourse, 
whose networks were analysed
• Following: To ‘follow’ an account is a choice  
a user makes to see content from a particular 
other user. 
• Friends: The accounts a user chooses  
to follow on Twitter
• Followers: The accounts that  
choose to follow a user on Twitter
Analysts identify key 
users of relevance 
to political discourse 












One relationship which has a crucial effect on the 
visibility and spread of disinformation online is 
that of followership. On Twitter, the accounts a 
user chooses to follow - their ‘friends’, in Twitter’s 
terminology - determine the content they are 
shown on their feed.68 
Social feeds are not a neutral ordering of 
information. Rather than displaying, for example, 
a chronological ordering of tweets sent by a 
user’s friends, Twitter presents content ordered by 
‘relevance.’ Like all social platforms, the algorithms 
used to determine relevance for tweets are 
constantly changed and experimented with, but a 
2017 blog post by the company explains that one 
aspect of a tweet which determines its priority on 
your feed is your relationship to a tweet’s author, 
and your “strength of connection to them”.69 
By following a user, then, you affect the content 
which you’re shown in two ways. In a direct sense, 
this user’s tweets will now appear in your feed, 
but you are also strengthening the connections 
between your account and the content your new 
friend interacts with, meaning this content is more 
likely to be judged ‘relevant’ to you.
One tool which can help study these relationships 
at scale is network analysis. This involves building 
a graph describing the links between them, and 
can help gain a high-level understanding of how 
people are connected online at scale, alongside any 
distinct collections of people within a larger group. 
It can also help us understand how SAGD might 
spread across social networks, and those groups 
who might be particularly likely to share it. 
Our key findings were: 
• Gendered disinformation occurring in these 
countries is often (though not exclusively) created 
or shared by those who have alignment in some 
way with the state. 
• In both cases, gendered disinformation was 
clustered particularly strongly in certain groups. 
• In contrast to disinformation, in the Philippines, 
counterspeech was more widely spread across a 
network.
• Counterspeech and gendered disinformation 
are often shared by the same groups of people, 
though this speech often takes different, 
politically-inflected forms in different groups. 
• In both cases, well-connected networks of 
relatively low-follower key accounts were found 
to be responsible for the largest quantities of 
gendered disinformation, rather than followers 
of popular political accounts - even when these 
latter had shared gendered disinformation 
themselves.
• Gendered disinformation does not always 
take place within an echo chamber. While the 
Philippines network shows a group of well 
connected users sharing gendered disinformation, 
those sharing this information in the Polish 
example were well connected to many key 
accounts, outside of those sharing gendered 
disinformation.
The graphs below map these users out, connecting 
key accounts (shown in colour below) to their 
followers and friends (shown in grey, as tiny points) 
by thin grey lines. These lines are drawn to be as 
short as possible, so that each user ends up close 
to those they follow.70 Key users are represented 
by ‘nodes’ or circles. Their followers and friends 
are represented by tiny grey dots which cluster 
together in ovoid clumps. These are two of the 
key graphs we produced: a full discussion of these 
findings and further findings can be found in the 
Appendix: Full Network Analysis). 
68.  This may seem odd at face value - Twitter does not use the word ‘friends’ much on the platform - but it’s regularly employed in the platform’s technical documentation. See 
for example the API page for getting statuses of friends here: Developer. Follow, Search and get users. Twitter. Available at https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/accounts-
and-users/follow-search-get-users/api-reference/get-friends-ids [accessed 15 May 20]
69.  Koumchatzky, N and Andryeyev, A. Using deep learning at scale in Twitter’s timelines. 2017. Available at https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics/insights/2017/
using-deep-learning-at-scale-in-twitters-timelines.html [accessed 15 May 20]
70. Note that we’re not drawing lines for connections between two grey dots - we only know which key accounts a user follows, so non-key accounts following each other don’t 
show up here.
‘Gendered disinformation occurring 
in these countries is often (though not 
exclusively) created or shared by those 




POLAND - USERS 
COLOURED 
AND SIZED BY 
DISINFORMATION
POLAND
Different groups of users are well-connected on 
Twitter: users follow multiple key users, which 
accounts for the relatively coherent circular shape 
of the map. This means that messages which are 
widely shared by one group of followers of key 
users are more likely to be passed on amongst the 
circle, raising the possibility that SAGD - as well as 
counterspeech - could more easily be spread to 
more users.
Though there are differences (shown in different 
colours) in how much gendered disinformation 
different users share, it is shared at a low level 
amongst most of the network. This map may 
suggest that the majority of followers of prominent 
political accounts are less likely to author or reshare 
disinformation than those who follow multiple 
smaller accounts picked up in our sample.
We found a higher concentration of users sharing 
gendered disinformation in certain clusters. A 
group, which was identified as containing people 
relevant to political and academic life and the 
media, accounts for 22% of total users, but it 
contains 37% of ‘relevant’ users - those who shared 
content identified as gendered disinformation. In 
contrast, another cluster, formed primarily around 
political accounts, contains 29% of the total user 
base, but only 17% of relevant users - under half as 
many. These relevant users tend to be positioned 
towards the centre of the graph, and by implication 
connected to a higher number of key accounts. A 
third cluster of users sits between the two on the 
graph, both in terms of its position on the graph, 
and its saturation of relevant accounts. 
Rather than focusing on high-profile, mainstream 
political accounts known to share gendered 
disinformation, attention should be paid to 
smaller, denser networks of users. While each of 
the ‘ringleader’ accounts may have a relatively 
small followership, the above suggests that their 
audience is more likely to follow other users who 
have shared gendered disinformation, and are 
more likely to have shared gendered disinformation 
themselves. 
User profiles
Of the original seed users, those who were 
identified as sharing messaging relevant to 
gendered disinformation included: 16 unique users 
(some of whom posted multiple times). Seven of 
these were involved in political life. Five others 
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were political operatives, several of whom were also 
prominent in state-aligned institutions or broader 
culture. Four were relevant either to politics, society, 
or institutions. Only one was verified on Twitter. 
Users reported they were in seven unique locations 
(or no location), all of which were in Poland. Their 
friends count ranged from 142 to 5,918 and they 
had between 1,712 and 187,588 followers. The 
average number of friends was 1,141 and the 







Of the followers and friends sample, those who 
were identified as sharing gendered disinformation 
messaging included: 115 unique users, none of 
whom were verified users, across 28 unique location 
values. The majority of these were in Poland, but 
included Germany and the USA. The follower count 
ranged between 0 and 7,447 and the friends count 
ranged between 6 and 5,398. The average number 
of followers was 309, and the average number of 
friends was 461.
This map shows that there are groups of key 
users who are spaced distantly from each other, 
with users in closely knit groups much less likely 
to follow relevant users from other groups. Users 
sharing gendered disinformation tend to be 
concentrated in one area of the network - a group 
separated from other key users towards the lower 
right of the graph (larger orange nodes). This may 
represent an echo chamber - users who are more 
likely to follow others in the group than other key 
users elsewhere on the graph, and who are likely  
to see, send and share high quantities of  
gendered disinformation.
The ‘gold’ accounts near the top of the map are 
related to politicians who are known to speak 
out against gendered harassment, gendered 
disinformation and abuse, as well as supportive 
human rights activists. Lying right under this cluster 
(suggesting they share followers) is a ‘light blue’ 
group, composed mostly of politicians, though 
also including media accounts and personalities. 
Some of these are more explicitly aligned with 
the government, while some are critical of the 
government. 
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Below this, the tightly clustered ‘orange’ accounts 
are commonly associated with cultural influencers 
and bloggers, mostly pro-Duterte and/or critical 
of the opposition. They show the ‘revolving door’ 
that exists between positions of political power 
and government authority, and those who are 
influential in online media and cultural discourse: 
some accounts are of those who have held both 
political and media roles at different times. Others 
are organisations, private individuals who comment 
on political affairs, and online political communities. 
These numbers show a clear difference between 
groups. The orange, pro-Duterte group makes up 
a mere 13% of users on the graph, but account for 
61% of users sharing gendered disinformation - 
though this cluster also accounts for 23% of users 
sharing counterspeech. In contrast, the Gold cluster, 
primary account following politicians speaking out 
against gendered harassment, accounts for 7% of 
the population and of gendered disinformation - 
but 21% of counterspeech. 
In the ‘orange’ group, the group of most interest 
in analysing SAGD specifically, hashtags shared 
in tweets which used a relevant term (from the 
lexicon) often focused on undermining women 
politicians, and also on supporting the government. 
“#leniresign” was used 10 times, “#lenifakenews” 
six times, “#fakevprobredo” four times, and 
“#protectourpresident” (in conjunction with 
other hashtags) 10 times. The conjunction of 
“#lenipowergrabber” and “#protectprrd [Duterte]” 
five times in the dataset implies a connection being 
made between undermining women in politics 
in the ways set out above, with the ‘protection’ 
of the state. Interestingly, this group also used 
#takebackthetech six times - a hashtag more 
commonly associated with counterspeech. In 
the ‘gold’ group of accounts, hashtags focused 
on speaking up against violence against women 
(“#metoo”, six times; “#violence against women”, 
four times; and “#endrapecultureph”, 12 times), as 
well as critiquing the state. 
The hashtag usage of these clusters alone 
support our identification of two different groups 
of particular interest: those who are broadly in 
support of or aligned with the state, who also 
join in with online conversations undermining 
prominent women in politics; and those who are 
further from the state and engage more clearly in 
counterspeech. This also appeared as a pattern 
in the word frequency of tweets shared by users 
in these groups, though the groups were not 
absolutely separate. Terms appeared across all 
three groups, but often terms more associated with 
SAGD (e.g. boba, presstitutes, saba) appeared 
more often in the ‘orange’ group, and terms more 
associated with counterspeech (misogyny, sexual 
violence) appear more often in the ‘gold’ group, 
with the ‘blue’ group as a middle ground.71  
User profiles
Of the original seed users, those who were 
identified as sharing gendered disinformation 
messaging included: eight unique users (some of 
whom posted multiple times), five of whom had 
been categorised as involved in culture - cultural 
leaders, bloggers - reflecting the in-country team 
steer that it was these ‘informal’, popular, often 
state-aligned sources who were the most likely to 
be spreading gendered disinformation. Two were 
more directly related to state operations. Another 
represented a pro-Duterte online community. The 
number of friends these users had (people they 
followed) varied between 26 and 829, and the 
number of followers varied between 142 to 78,443. 
The average number of friends was 337, and the 
average number of followers was 17,229. Hence 
while not the largest presences on Twitter, some 
have significant networks. 
3 users shared news relevant to gendered 
disinformation including a target of it. 
Of the followers and friends sample who we 
identified as sharing gendered disinformation, 
there were 216 unique users. None were verified; 
their friends ranged between 1 and 4,859, and 
their followers between 0 to 17,614. They were 
reportedly from 89 different locations (note that 
these are set by the user themselves so may not 
necessarily be accurate - indeed, some were jokes) - 
many were from the Philippines, but there were also 
users who said they were located in the US, Europe 
and Asia. The average number of friends was 303, 
and the average number of followers was 773.
Of the original users who engaged in 
counterspeech (understood in the broadest sense, 
of speaking against violence against women), there 
were 16 unique users. These included some of the 
original users who shared gendered disinformation, 
71. “Bitch” appearing on its own was found only in the orange group, but phrases which included the term e.g. “yes bitch” were found in other groups. 
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showing that there are not always ‘clear sides’ 
that people fall on. There was more political 
representation in this set - there were again several 
‘cultural leaders’ or bloggers (seven) but also three 
politicians as well as the two state affiliated actors 
identified in the first set. The friends range in this 
group was between 14 and 1,317, and the followers 
group 72 to 155,447.
What this shows is that gendered disinformation 
occurring in these countries is often created or 
shared by those who have alignment with the state. 
Given the non-representative initial selection of 
the accounts we examined, we cannot say that it is 
always or most often, (and indeed is not exclusively) 
shared by state-aligned actors. However, this does 
point to gendered disinformation being one way in 
which state-aligned actors are engaging online.
How state-aligned gendered disinformation occurs 
online, however, is extremely context-dependent: 
not only do different groups of people hold power 
to shape online political discourse, but the ways 
in which they are connected with other users of an 
online platform varies hugely. The range of people 
who engage in gendered disinformation relating 
to a particular country is wide, both geographically 
and in terms of online reach and influence - 
from significant social or political influencers to 
individuals with small followings. This supports an 
understanding of the methods and operations of 
gendered disinformation whereby messages shared 
by powerful influencers, overtly or covertly, spread 
out to reach a wide audience who in turn co-opt the 
messaging and make it their own.72  
Moreover, they highlight the challenge of 
identifying state-based gendered disinformation: 
as those who engage in SAGD are often interacting 
in smaller, less prominent networks - or in account 
clusters adjacent to but not coextensive with 
governmental account clusters. 
Solutions to state-aligned gendered disinformation, 
therefore, must take into account where SAGD is 
occurring in a network. Sometimes it may be clearly 
clustered in one ‘echo chamber’ community online; 
other times it will be spread out across different 
online communities. 
However, there are still commonalities between how 
SAGD is presented online which may assist in its 
identification even across different network systems. 
We present these below.
72. Corpus Ong, J. and Cabanes, J.V. Architects of Networked Disinformation. University of Leeds, 2018. Available at http://newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/ARCHITECTS-OF-NETWORKED-DISINFORMATION-FULL-REPORT.pdf [accessed 12 March 2020]
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CHAPTER 4  
THE RULES 
OF THE GAME
We have thus considered who is engaging in 
state-aligned gendered disinformation and 
counterspeech online. We now turn to how  
they do so.
State-aligned gendered disinformation follows 
clear patterns. These are not incidental or 
coincidence. Rather, there are ‘rules’ established as 
to what an actor should do and how they should 
behave in order to pursue a political agenda of 
excluding women from public life. These ‘rules’ 
may be prescribed in more formal networks of 
disinformation, or observed and copied or mutually 
defined by informally connected actors. This was 
found in an examination by the NDI of online 
violence against women in politics in Indonesia: 
where “when a user experiences violence on the 
platform and other users quickly join in, either 
through amplifying the original violence through 
‘re-tweets’ or compositions of their own”.73  
Those engaging in disinformation are not only 
trying to influence people’s thoughts but the very 
parameters and contours of discussion - networks 
of disinformation in the Philippines have been 
compared to an ad agency, trying to control how 
people view and talk about a brand through the 
spread of particular messaging.74 Through engaging 
in online political discourse in set ways, whether 
that is the use of certain words, hashtags, tropes or 
targeting particular people and groups, the rules of 
online political discourse itself are re-shaped, into 
a language game which excludes women as full, 
active and respected members. 
It is through this lens that we present six ‘rules’: 
these are patterns we consistently observed in this 
research in how women in public life were attacked 
and spoken about, and gendered narratives which 
were being manipulated by state-aligned actors 
and their networks. We focused on Poland and the 
Philippines specifically, but these rules have echoes 
globally in the kinds of abuse women are subjected 
to and the narratives which authoritarian leaders 
aim to promote to consolidate their own power 
and political agendas. Their aim is to undermine 
women in public life, to bolster their critics, and to 
demonstrate the power that can be brought to bear 
on women who step out of line. Taken together, 
they call for women’s role in politics, democracy 
and society to be reduced or removed. 
Identifying how far these tactics are deliberate 
(i.e. deliberate instructions to disinformation 
agents) and how far they have organically 
developed through gendered disinformation-
aligned conversations online is a challenge, but 
describing them demonstrates likely patterns that 
conversations which attack or denigrate women are 
likely to take. 
We primarily examine state-aligned content - that 
is, which was shared by a known state-aligned actor, 
or which aligns with the state’s political goals or 
‘State-aligned gendered disinformation 
follows clear patterns. These are not 
incidental or coincidence. ‘
73. Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 2019, p. 17.  
Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 2020]
74.  Ong, J.C. and Cabanes, J.V. Architects of Networked Disinformation. University of Leeds, 2018. Available at http://newtontechfordev.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/
ARCHITECTS-OF-NETWORKED-DISINFORMATION-FULL-REPORT.pdf [accessed 12 March 2020]
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attacks critics of the state, or which uses a trope 
already well documented as being part of a state 
disinformation campaign.75 However, not all of the 
actors who engaged in gendered disinformation, 
whose tweets we discuss below, are aligned with 
the state: some are even explicitly aligned against 
the state. We include these as they demonstrate 
to an extent the permeability of online discourse: 
how tropes used by state-aligned actors reflect 
and reinforce those used elsewhere in online 
conversations rather than create them anew, and 
how those perpetuating and countering violence 
against women may sometimes be the same people 
in different contexts. This highlights a key challenge 
in combating gendered disinformation: that the 
boundaries are not always precise. 
By identifying messages shared by key influencers 
of online political discourse, which weaponise 
gendered language and narratives against known 
targets of gendered disinformation, we are able to 
characterise how the conversation about women in 
public life is being shaped.
RULE 1  
Convince others that women are devious:  
they are not fit for politics
A central narrative in gendered disinformation is 
that women are not fit for public or private political 
lives, and as such, should be excluded. Most 
frequently, this language surrounds their character: 
as presented through gendered disinformation, 
women are devious, unreliable and fake. 
“Fake news” has been weaponised. Originally 
coined to combat disinformation, it is now part 
of the populist playbook, and is a widely-used 
tool in attacking women. Women journalists are 
accused of being “fake news”. Claims that they 
are funded through dubious or corrupt means are 
common. Women politicians are said to lie about 
their motives and about their political principles, 
deliberately playing on cultural stereotypes that 
women are fickle and untrustworthy. It is also a 
highly powerful tool - calling someone a liar then 
works to invalidate any past and future claims they 
can make in the eyes of persuaded observers, 
without having to refute each claim individually. 
Treason and disloyalty emerged as a major theme 
in the Polish gendered disinformation data. 
Accusations of actions against “Church and state” 
were frequently levelled at women politicians in 
the country on Twitter. Women were accused of 
harbouring loyalties to Russia, to feminst principles, 
to leftism and communism and to powers hostile 
to the Polish state. Anti-Semitic conspiracy 
thinking was also represented. Zdraja (traitor) and 
zdrada (treason) were common insults. Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke, a far-Right politician in Poland 
famously described international women’s day as 
a Communist invention. Elsewhere, Aleksandra 
Dulkiewicz, the mayor of Gdansk and a common 
target of online attacks, has reported being 
targeted by disinformation alluding to anti-Polish 
intentions, such as a faked photo of her wearing a 
Nazi helmet and the flag of the Third Reich.76  
Women in public life in the Philippines are also 
frequently portrayed as liars, devious and criminal. 
Journalists who criticise Duterte, women and 
especially those who work at Rappler, a woman-
led organisation, are described as “presstitutes”, 
“fake news”, “fake reporter” and “paid hacks” 
- implying they are playing at journalism and only 
pretending to be reporting serious issues for 
the benefit of some mysterious funder (“yellow 
funded presstitutes”). Some have gone further than 
devious but portrayed them as “an evil genius” for 
unleashing “hell” on others. Leni Robredo, vice-
president of the Philippines, who was fired from 
heading up the government’s anti-drug agency 
after criticizing extrajudicial killings, is frequently 
attacked using a variety of hashtags and phrases 
related to “fake VP” and “#FakeVP” and has been 
called a “cheater” and “liar”.77 Charges of being 
fake or lying are often used in conjunction with 
“bitch”, emphasising that it is a nasty woman who is 
dishonest: “lying bitch” “fraudulent monster bitch” 
“despicable greedy hypocrite bitch”. Criticism of 
others includes charges that they only “[pretend] to 
be relevant”; and when women speak out against 
their abuse, they are told their claims are “bull” (see 
Rules Two and Three). 
In a similar vein to the portrayal of women as 
evil, scheming liars, we also found women being 
portrayed as being badly motivated - having 
“ulterior motives”, “motivated by self interest” “not 
[motivated] by love of country”, working not for the 
general good or the public interest as they claim, 
but to pursue their own agenda, which is often as 
simple as their own glorification “she’s simply a 
bitch and just wants the attention all the time”. This 
latter charge was found in both the original seed 
user dataset and the follower and friends dataset. 
75. However, we also found gendered disinformation being used against women who were aligned with the state.
76. TVN24. Mayor of Gdańsk received offensive fake photos. Prosecutor’s office drops the case. 2020. Available at https://tvn24.pl/tvn24-news-in-english/mayor-of-
gdansk-received-offensive-fake-photos-prosecutors-office-drops-the-case-3046045 [accessed 15 May 20]
77. Santos, A. P. “Are you afraid?”: Philippines’ Robredo defiant over drugs war. Al Jazeera, 2019. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/afraid-
philippines-robredo-defiant-drugs-war-191126043336589.html [accessed 30 July 20]
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“Traitor” was also levelled against women in the 
Philippines (“crazy bitch traitor” “surely [she] is a 
traitor”).
The impact of this is not simply to undermine these 
women’s standing, to attack their reputations or 
cause them individual psychological harm. These 
attacks aim to turn the truth on its head; and the 
cumulative effect of these repeated attacks on 
women as being liars and frauds is to paint a picture 
within which women who are prominent in public 
life are not to be trusted with such an important 
role. Not only are they wrong about things - 
they are deliberately and wickedly scheming to 
manipulate the wider public - playing into long-held 
stereotypes about women as witches or succubi. 
It also serves to protect those who attack and 
undermine women, since criticism by a woman who 
is dishonest cannot be legitimate. This echoes a 
known strategy of political disinformation identified 
in our report Warring Songs - to critique opponents 
in order to ensure that one’s own political position 
remains strong.78 Their very existence as women in 
public life must be a sham - because women do not 
belong there.
nazwanie bohatera zdrajcą to doły.  
nazwanie go zdrajcą przez zdrajcę to 
najgorsze suka (sorry).
Calling a hero a traitor is awful. Calling  
a hero a traitor when you yourself are  
the traitor is the worst, bitch (sorry). 
[She] said: ‘I have no plans to replace 
President Duterte’ - Liar, liar, liar - that lying 
bitch is lying about her ulterior motives.
RULE 2:  
Denounce women as too stupid for public life
Through a mix of cited pseudoscience, old-
fashioned ‘humour’ and general abuse, the 
stupidity of women was a regular topic of gendered 
disinformation in the datasets we examined.
In Politics, Aristotle saw women as inferior to men, 
lacking the authority to govern.79 Centuries later, 
populist leaders around the world continue to 
repeat these tropes, with particular ire reserved for 
women who challenge a male political hegemony. 
Many examples can be given from around the 
world: Trump lashing out at a woman of colour 
journalist and insulting the reporter’s intelligence 
and competence in 2018.80 The deputy Prime 
Minister of Italy Matteo Salvini comparing the 
female president of the lower house of parliament 
to a sex doll in 2016.81 And Jair Bolsonaro, 
President of Brazil, mocking women opposing his 
views as stupid and “unworthy of rape”.82 This 
approach to undermine women in politics and 
public life was noted by the in-country team in the 
Philippines, and is borne out in our dataset. 
In the Philippines, there was a great deal of 
discussion about news stories, and notably around 
political leaders (mostly Duterte) making sexist 
or misogynistic comments - from rape jokes to 
insulting world leaders as “sons of whores”. This 
sparked, not only discussion of the news stories 
themselves, and analysis of what they meant for 
Duterte (often that he was still ahead, or was the 
focus of discussion despite his remarks) - and 
admittedly a lot of counterspeech denouncing 
the speech - but also uses of this news in order to 
further political attacks on women.
During the period researched, a male politician in 
the Philippines called the woman Vice President 
of the Philippines, “boba” in a tweet.83 ‘Boba’ 
is one commonly used gendered slur, meaning 
‘someone (a woman) who is stupid’. In our dataset 
of most politically influential seed users, one user 
sent four different tweets in response to this: from 
making comments that it was not only accurate 
(‘descriptive’) but that it was legitimate given the 
“name-calling” of Duterte that his critics engage 
in, to saying that he had ruined the joke by saying 
it because it was a “national secret joke”. These 
tweets received between 22 and 414 favourites 
(the third most favourited tweet in the set), and 
3-89 retweets - a total of 727 favourites and 139 
retweets. 
These tweets were shared widely among the 
followers and friends of the influential accounts: 
17 tweets (copied or retweeted from the original 
tweet) included a news story from the Manila 
Bulletin on the incident alongside the text of the 
original “boba” comment from among our friends 
and follower network alone. These tweets did 
not directly comment in support or critique of the 
comment, and so intention is hard to discern - 
78. Krasodomski-Jones, A. and others. Warring Songs: Information Operations in the Digital Age. Demos, 2019. Available at https://demos.co.uk/project/warring-
songs-information-operations-in-the-digital-age/.  [accessed 13 May 20]
79. Aristotle. The Politics (Classics). Penguin Classics, 2000. 
80.  Morin, R. Trump draws rebukes for scolding female reporters of color. Politico, 2018. Available at https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/09/trump-cnn-white-
house-access-980280. [accessed 13 May 20]
81.  Beinart, P. The New Authoritarians Are Waging War on Women. The Atlantic, 2019. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/
authoritarian-sexism-trump-duterte/576382/ [accessed 13 May 20]
82.  Philips, T. Stop this disaster’: Brazilian women mobilise against ‘misogynist’ far-right Bolsonaro. The Guardian, 21 September 2018. Available at https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/brazilian-women-against-jair-bolosonaro-misogynist-far-right-candidate [accessed 13 May 20]
83.  ABS-CBN News. Locsin calls Robredo ‘boba,’ then says sorry for being ‘disrespectful’. ABS-CNN News, 2019. Available at https://news.abs-cbn.com/
news/06/24/19/boba-locsin-blasts-robredo-over-comments-on-diplomatic-passports-cancellation [accessed 13.05.20]
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however, by retweeting the original comment and 
including the full text of the insult, the message and 
normalisation of that as an insult towards the Vice 
President was extended.  
What we’ve all been saying for longest time, 
is now even confirmed in the government.
Indeed, Leni is boba and has not got a brain.
The Vice President is embarrassing 
[translation] 
Although the politician apologised soon after to 
Robredo, this shows how a comment online by 
a government official or by a political influencer 
can trickle down by virtue of having the exposure 
and political spotlight, bringing to light something 
which previously was seen as ’hidden’. 
It is worth noting that this event sparked criticism 
and counterspeech online - our dataset included 
affirmations of Robredo’s “beautiful mind” (itself 
invoking a gendered term) or users chastising or 
even attacking the original speaker. 
This theme - of women being stupid and in 
particular brainless, came up again and again in our 
dataset, often in the context of vitriolic language, 
and was used to reinforce false stories or rumours 
about women politicians. “Can’t even organize 
her thoughts properly”, “incompetent”, “brainless 
bitch[es]”, “dead useless brain”, “senseless”, 
“boobs for brains”, “shrinked brain”: these were 
used mostly against women who were critical 
of the state, but also state-aligned prominent 
women. We saw tweets claiming that a politician’s 
rumoured sexual behaviour had led to her making 
bad decisions - “is this what saba [banana] did to 
her brain?” asked one user about a senator’s policy 
position. This was attacking Leila de Lima, often 
referred to with the term ‘saba’ as this term was one 
used in de Lima’s hearing, as a witness claimed that 
her affair involved she and her partner feeding each 
other bananas.   
Any misstep that women make is also instantly 
pounced on and not easily forgiven - or even 
fabricated where no mistake was made. We found 
references in the dataset to Robredo not being able 
to do maths, and calling her “boba” or an “insult” 
as a result - presumably a reference to when 
Robredo was speaking about the cost of rice, after 
which many accused her of making a multiplication 
error. A prominent journalist was misquoted 
regarding a statement on rape threats against her: 
this misquoting was then also used against her, 
with users online commenting that maybe she 
misunderstood or was exaggerating the threat - 
simultaneously invoking that she had made a stupid 
mistake while also disregarding the existence of 
the original abuse by compounding it. Thus, that 
women are too stupid to understand things is used 
as a tool to counter allegations of existing abuse 
and harassment.
And stupidity is not the only attack on women’s 
brains that people make. “Gaga” and “crazy” 
were also used frequently (e.g. “crazy bitch traitor” 
“idiot...stupid gaga”) - a well-known trope for 
dismissing women, their beliefs and experiences.
Still, your Boba VP cannot take over –  
she is INCOMPETENT
In 2017, a Polish MEP went on a rant in Parliament 
over the weakness of women, saying that “Of 
course women must earn less than men because 
they are weaker, they are smaller, they are less 
intelligent”.84 This comment re-emerged during 
the data collection and was widely shared. The 
dataset as a whole was littered with accusations of 
stupidity around decisions made by Polish women 
politicians, most commonly in response to news 
articles reporting those decisions.
@user Idiotyczna dziwka bez szkoły
@user Stupid uneducated slut
These tactics aim to show that women are not 
thinking correctly - and that therefore what they 
say should not be believed. The message of these 
tweets is similar to that of Story One: that women 
are not to be believed, that they are not fit for 
office. Whether it is deliberate deceit, physical or 
mental illness, lack of intelligence or knowledge, 
women are seen as being unable to be competent 
or experts. 
RULE 3:  
Make women afraid to talk back
Over the past five years, platforms have made 
changes aimed at improving the experience of 
vulnerable users, though targeting of women in 
coordinated online abuse continues today.  
Women calling out this harrassment, or using tools 
to reduce it through blocking or muting accounts, 
was often mentioned in abuse. On top of this, 
platform decisions seen to be protecting women 
were also decried.
84. The Telegraph. Sexist Polish MP suspended and fined for saying women should be paid less. The Telegraph, 2017. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/03/14/sexist-polish-mep-suspended-fined-saying-women-should-paid-less/ [accessed 13 May 20]
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In the Poland dataset, tweets decried the removal 
of content by the platform, and on other platforms 
such as Facebook, as protecting the “sodomite 
standards” and “feminist perverts” in that online 
space. Women who blocked their abusers were 
called out as cowardly and afraid of debate, or 
that they were hiding from those looking to hold 
them to account. We noticed a pattern whereby 
an unblocked user would post about a prominent 
woman, and users that had already been blocked 
would join the conversation, most often citing the 
fact they had been blocked as further evidence to 
the group that the woman was duplicitous, scared 
or an opponent of free expression. 
@user zamknij się kurwo - teraz na pewno 
mnie zablokujesz. tchórz :)
@user Shut up whore - you’ll block me now 
of course. coward :)
In the Philippines, women journalists - particularly 
those who are critical of the Duterte’s government 
- are the primary targets of disinformation 
campaigns,85 dubbed “presstitutes” for their so-
called duplicitous and compromised reporting 
against Duterte.86 The label “presstitute” was used 
in our dataset continuously as a method to discredit 
journalists or the media, sometimes suggesting that 
the media as an institution had been taken over 
and compromised by these reporters. Tweets would 
directly discredit reporters, suggesting that “May 
be they are not presstitutes - maybe they are just 
inept, stupid people that think they’re journalists”. 
Many, though, would be more clearly directed at 
discrediting the female journalists for “telling-a-lie 
to the public” about Duterte or his policies. Some 
would go further and call for their removal from 
public life, along with other enemies of the state 
regime: for example, “All bad things must come 
to an end! Liberal Parties, Presstitutes, Drug lords, 
Narco politicians, Criminal” and sometimes with 
physical call to actions, such as those that would 
instruct others to kick “the butts of presstitutes”.
That the term is so widely used is not unique to 
the Philippines, has been traced back to General 
Vijay Kumar Singh, a politician and former Army 
general in India,87 where critics claim it has become 
a regular part of hate speech against female 
journalists on social media.88 In the Philippines, 
journalists argue that the term can be used by both 
sides of the information war - criticising pro-Duterte 
social media users for spreading disinformation 
themselves - although our dataset suggests it is 
rarely used as counter speech.89 
Maria Ressa, the CEO of the online news site 
Rappler, has received exceptional online abuse 
for speaking back to power and has regularly 
been called “presstitute” in our dataset.90,91 She 
is now world famous for speaking out against the 
“propaganda techniques” that troll those who are 
deemed non-compliant with the status quo in the 
Philippines with words like presstitutes. We found 
tweets that would directly discredit her attempts 
to talk back, for example, calling her a “bitch” 
that “keeps on saying that she is being oppressed 
when she isn’t”or rejecting her claims that pro-
Duterte accounts have been sending her rape 
threats, calling it “fake news”. There seems to be 
a feedback loop on Twitter, as the more women 
speak back against disinformation, the more abuse 
they receive for their defences.92  
Frequently also observed in the Philippines 
data were tweets aimed at internationally 
famous women, not from the Philippines, who 
had commented on the political situation in 
the Philippines - from celebrities to UN Special 
Rapporteurs. These women were attacked in a 
similar way to others - called “bitch” “old witch” 
“idiot” or “gaga”.  Their being not from the 
Philippines was specifically weaponised, as they 
were portrayed as meddling outsiders who didn’t 
know what they were talking about - “you are not 
welcome”, “our business not yours”, “do your 
research b4 you talk”.
85. Combinido, P. When illiberal social media takes over democratic Philippines. New Mandala, 2019. Available at   https://www.newmandala.org/when-illiberal-
social-media-takes-over-democratic-philippines/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
86.  Sombatpoonsiri, J. Manipulating Civic Space: Cyber Trolling in Thailand and the Philippines. GIGA Focus, Asia, Number 3. 2018. Available at  https://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf_asien_1803_en.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
87.  Valderama, T.C. Who’s the real “presstitute?”. The Manila Times, 2016. Available at
  https://www.manilatimes.net/2016/09/25/opinion/columnists/whos-the-real-presstitute/287885/ [accessed 13 May 20]
88.  David, S. #Presstitute: The Online War Against Women With An Opinion. The Citizen, 2017. https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/7/10942/
Presstitute-The-Online-War-Against-Women-With-An-Opinion [accessed 13 May 20]
89.  Valderama, T.C. Who’s the real “presstitute?”. The Manila Times, 2016. Available at
  https://www.manilatimes.net/2016/09/25/opinion/columnists/whos-the-real-presstitute/287885/ [accessed 13 May 20]
90.  Etter, L. What Happens When the Government Uses Facebook as a Weapon?. Bloomberg Businessweek, 2017. Available at  https://www.rappler.com/
nation/148007-propaganda-war-weaponizing-internet [accessed 13 May 20]
91.  Posetti, J. Fighting back against prolific online harassment in the Philippines. The Conversation, 2017. Available at https://theconversation.com/fighting-back-
against-prolific-online-harassment-in-the-philippines-80271 [accessed 13 May 20]
92.  ‘Pile-ons’ where Twitter users jump onto and join in with existing abuse was also found in a study of online violence against women in politics in Indonesia: 
see Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 20]
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There was some criticism also of the ‘Bawal Bastos’ 
law against gendered harassment, which echoed 
this critique of women standing up to harassment 
as somehow ‘hypocritical’.93 
The anti-bastos law was permission for women to 
dress bastos?!...Now women have permission to 
dress like a slut and not to be called a slut…
The purpose of this story is not only to further 
discredit public women to outside observers, and 
try to discredit their statements (which in the case of 
internationally famous women and politicians, may 
reach a huge audience), but to send a message to 
the women themselves - if you talk back, we will 
redouble our efforts against you.
RULE 4:  
Praise women for being sexy, condemn them  
for being sexual
Sexualised distortion is common in disinformation 
campaigns against women - from sharing doctored 
photos of women politicians naked, to screenshots 
purporting to be from sex tapes, to accusations of 
illicit affairs. The power of these tactics comes from 
social norms which pervade about women and their 
sexuality - from the ‘virgin’ archetype that women 
should remain pure, to the ‘whore’ - that women 
are obscenely sexual and will use their sexuality 
to get what they want. Manipulated or misleading 
sexual images alleging to be of women in public 
life and rumours about affairs and pregnancies 
are frequently circulated - a clear and persistent 
example of SAGD as sexualised distortion. 
The examples below are consistent with sexualised 
distortion as a tactic seen used against women 
globally. Although they may appear very ‘personal’, 
in that they are talking about (or purport to talk 
about) women’s private lives, they appeal to 
norms and ideals about how women ‘should’ 
behave which can influence voter behaviour 94 : 
demonstrating how what may appear as simple 
rumour can be driven by significant political 
motivation.
These images and associated commentary have 
even been used to give ‘credence’ to criminal 
allegations against women critical of national 
leadership such as Leila de Lima in the Philippines.95 
Much of the discussion we saw around Leila de 
Lima online focussed on her alleged affair - with 
her often even not referred to by name, but by the 
term “saba queen”. Tweets accused her of giving 
out sexual favours to her security detail and drivers 
and she was described as a “whore that satisfy her 
sexual desires”. These kinds of discussion operate 
on multiple levels: they reinforce entrenched 
gender norms about how Filipino women ‘should’ 
behave, while also leveraging those norms to 
discredit a critic of the government and bolster the 
campaign against her.
In our data set, some tweets, which were on the 
border between counterspeech and gendered 
disinformation appeared more sympathetic to 
women targets, but still undermined them on the 
basis that women were too sexual or emotional: 
showing that it may not only be a woman’s direct 
opponents who engage in SAGD, but that these 
narratives may percolate out to others who have 
more sympathy but still amplify the misleading and 
politically powerful message.
Humans make mistakes because of love  
and sex - de Lima is only one of them.
@user De lima is whore that satisfies her 
sexual desires and is involved with the  
drug pushers - it was proven that is why  
she is in jail...
And it was not simply those targeting women critics 
of Duterte who engaged in these narratives. Mocha 
Uson, a prominent Duterte supporter, pop star and 
blogger,96 who has worked in several government 
positions,97 was frequently the target of this 
sexualised distortion - even as people criticised her 
for attacking other women. Tweets expressed the 
sentiment that she had no business being involved 
in politics and she should stick to being a “slut”, a 
“mere sexy starlet”, “filthy bitch” “cheap whore”, 
“bitch” and engaging in sexual activity. One user 
said they had more respect for her when she was 
“just a slut” than her “propaganda” work. A tweet, 
which appeared several times with different Twitter 
users mentioned in the tweet each time, asked 
why anyone would bother with her, a “prostitute” 
pretending to be intelligent, who was only good 
at a long list of sex acts. There were many shares 
of the news that the Mocha Girls, a group of which 
Mocha Uson was one, would give up “sexy shows” 
in a show of support for Duterte. 
93. Torregoza, H. Hontiveros welcomes signing of IRR for ‘Bawal Bastos’ law. Manila Bulletin, 2019. Available at https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/10/28/hontiveros-
welcomes-signing-of-irr-for-bawal-bastos-law/ [accessed 13 May 20]
94.  See, e.g. Bjarnegård, E. Men’s Political Representation. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2018; and Edström, J. Undressing Patriarchy in the Male 
Order Development Encounter in Engaging Men in Building Gender Equality, ed. Flood, M. and Howson, R., Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, pp. 71-85. 
95.  Occeñola, P. Fake News, Real Women: Disinformation Gone Macho. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-
disinformation-gone-macho [accessed 03 May 20]
96. Chen, A. When a populist demagogue takes power. The New Yorker. 2016. Available at  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/21/when-a-populist-
demagogue-takes-power [accessed 13 May 2020]
97.  Occeñola, P. Fake News, Real Women: Disinformation Gone Macho. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/217563-
disinformation-gone-macho [accessed 03 May 20]
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“aggressive” and received praise for frequently 
swearing “putangina” [son of a whore]. Conversely, 
criticism of him included calling him a “sissy bitch”. 
One tweet said the Philippines would always 
have a “pussy culture” if it did not honour military 
personnel (a traditional masculine endeavour). This 
is in line with how also men who criticise Duterte 
can be the subjects of gendered harassment - such 
as Senator Antonio Trillanes, targeted with memes 
that showed him as “effeminate”, and the subject 
of allegations he was having an affair with a news 
anchor.100  
While strongmen are lifted up, women are talked 
down to. A report published by the International 
Press Institute is helpful to understand the 
experiences of female journalists in Poland.101  
They held conversations with female journalists 
in Warsaw about online attacks against female 
journalists. Interviewed journalists said they face 
condescending comments online daily. This 
includes being addressed by their first name, or a 
diminutive of it (usually reserved for small children 
or close family situations), rather than by the polite 
“Pani” (Ms.) used between strangers in Poland. 
As with Rule Four, in both the Philippines and 
Poland datasets we saw ‘strongmen’ approaches 
defended on the grounds of protecting women. 
Bringing back the death penalty, or even the 
occurrence of extrajudicial killings were justified 
or called for frequently by the need to prevent 
rape and punish rapists. This focus on rape, in 
conjunction with praise for strong men, can create 
a distorted picture of womanhood, as something 
primarily characterised by the constant threat of 
violent attack and therefore in need of protection 
from those less at risk. 
...I do pity the next President! How, in the 
world, is he/she’s going to get some balls  
to get things done. 
feministki boja się silnych i “białych” 
mężczyzn. reagując agresją jak ktoś się z nią 
nie zgadza. probujaca ograniczyć  
kogoś zachowania
Feminists are scared of strong and “white” 
men. Reacting aggressively if somebody 
doesn’t agree with them. Trying to limit  
their behaviour.
The Polish data focused on the importance 
of preserving the purity of Polish women. The 
dominant theme was in the importance of severe 
punishments for rape, couched in language 
insisting on the need for strong men to protect 
women. Tweets in this category ranged from 
personal anecdotes about beating up people, 
including likely apocryphal stories of attacking 
migrants who were harassing a woman, through to 
explicit calls for more stringent punishments for sex 
crimes against women. Much of the language was 
heavily conspiratorial, with a focus on paedophilia 
within the Church and political opposition and 
emphasising an association between refugees and 
migrants and sexual crime. 
[LINK] trzeba chronić polskie kobiety.  
o zaostrzenie kary zagwałt - podpisz:  
[LINK] #rapefugees
[LINK] We must protect Polish women.  
To increase the penalty for rape - sign here: 
[LINK] #rapefugees
RULE 5:  
Show everyone that the strong men will  
save them 
The character of ‘strongmen’ in politics is making a 
comeback.98 One of the most prominent examples 
of this is Vladimir Putin, seeming to restore the 
‘good old Russia’. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
is called ‘the tall man’ attributing to his physique 
but also his rule of nearly two decades. In Hungary, 
Viktor Orban is more powerful than ever. And 
Donald Trump keeps up with these men; in 2019, 
he attacked four Democratic congresswomen 
including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, saying they 
should“go back to where they came from”.99  
These ‘strongmen’ demonstrate similarities in 
their attitudes towards women. When women 
try to reclaim their power or raise their voice, 
they see it as a challenge to their rule as well. 
Hence they encourage an undermining discourse 
towards women and other genders, to support 
their policies such as banning abortion, their anti-
LGBT sentiments and their ideas on where women 
belong. 
Comments about Duterte found in the Philippines 
data divided into positive and negative assessments 
- both of which employed the idea that a good 
leader is a strong man. He is seen as “courageous”, 
98. Bremmer, I. The Strongmen era is here: here is what it means for you. Time, 2018. Available at https://time.com/5264170/the-strongmen-era-is-here-heres-what-
it-means-for-you/ [accessed 03 May 20]
99.  Pengelly, M.’Go back home’: Trump aims racist attack at Ocasio-Cortez and other congresswomen. The Guardian, 2019.  
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/14/trump-squad-tlaib-omar-pressley-ocasio-cortez [accessed 5 May 2020]
100. Combinido. P. When Illiberal Social Media Takes over Democratic Philippines. New Mandala, 2019. Available at:  https://www.newmandala.org/when-illiberal-
social-media-takes-over-democratic-philippines/ [accessed 5 May 2020]
101.  International Press Institute. Online Attacks on Journalists in Poland. International Press Institute, 2018. Available at https://ipi.media/poland-on-the-line/ 
[accessed 5 May 2020]
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We also saw campaigns aiming to get women in 
public life currently to leave, by any means possible. 
In our dataset we saw many calls via hashtags 
for the Vice President of the Philippines to leave 
office - either through impeachment, resigning 
or losing an election. Though some hashtags 
were used more than others, there was not 
overall consistency of hashtags used, suggesting 
perhaps more organic coming up with hashtags 
or varying on a central theme than attempts to 
coordinate a campaign via a specific hashtags. 
Examples included “#OustLeni2020”, “#FakeVP”, 
“#ImpeachLeniRobredo”, “#LeniResign” and 
“#GoodbyeLeni”. Some tweets included physically 
threatening calls to action.
The message to people is clear - swear, be 
aggressive, and do not, whatever you do, whoever 
you are, be like a woman. Women are for protecting 
- they should not be leaders. 
RULE 6:  
Demonise the values women hold
The amalgamation of Left-wing politics and 
feminist politics was a central feature of gendered 
disinformation explored by this research. By eliding 
the two, conservative or Right-wing governments 
such as those investigated portray feminism as anti-
governmental and oppositional. 
In Poland, Feministka (feminist, diminuitive) was 
used as a term of abuse. Abuse targeting the 
left-wing politician Joanna Wicha explained how 
her shortcomings were the fault of her “leftist, 
feminist brain”. Advocating for left-wing and 
centre-left policies were mocked or caricatured 
through association with feminism: climate change 
was mockingly attributed to “the patriarchy” in 
a number of Tweets targeting left-wing Polish 
politicians. Left-wing positions on abortion and 
birth control in particular provoked abuse.
wg lewicy aborcja jest ok bo „zarodek”  
nic nie czuje. feministka po tabletce  
gwałtu też nic nie czuje. więc: -pewnie  
gwałt się nie liczy.
Leftists like you think abortion is fine 
because an “embryo” doesn’t feel anything. 
A feminist after a rape can take a morning 
after pill and also feels nothing, so clearly 
rape is not a crime either. 
There was little discussion identified of feminism 
specifically in the Philippines data we examined - 
however, women were accused of being funded 
by those opposed to the state (which included 
anti-semitic tropes): “yellow paid presstitutes” 
and “yellow funded presstitutes”.102 There 
were references to “yellowtards” “yellows” 
“yellowf*ckers” “yellowshits” often in tweets which 
attacked women - “idiot puppet yellow-ass bitch” 
or groups in a gendered way such as “presstitutes”. 
Critics of Duterte were referred to as “yellow trolls”. 
This reflected a broader trend of women being 
called “yellows” in a derogatory fashion.
Why Duterte fired Robredo: One: She is a 
woman who cannot stop her mouth both  
up and down Two: She was serious in 
bringing the government down using her 
useless dead brain Three: She could not 
be trusted since Day 1 since she is just an 
FVP used by the Yellow Crabbies 4. She is 
becoming too BOBA!
This dissipates the message that anyone with 
political views opposing the current regime - 
and particularly where those views regard the 
emancipation of women - that those views are 
illegitimate, disgusting and dangerous.
 
102.  Yellow is associated with the Liberal Party and the political family of former Presidents Corazon Aquino and President Benigno Simeon Aquino, 
before President Duterte. Before the 2016 elections, the Aquinos and liberals were the targets of demonization on social media.
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CHAPTER 5  
TALKING BACK  
AND SPEAKING UP
We used gendered terms to identify where 
gendered disinformation was occurring in our 
dataset. A trend which came out of the Philippines 
in particular, when we examined the data more 
closely, was that many of these terms are being 
used by users, including targets of gendered 
disinformation, to call out their attackers and speak 
up against abuse. It is important to acknowledge 
that women are not passive victims of gendered 
disinformation and harassment - they are fighting 
back against it, and have many allies in that fight. 
For instance, Leni Robredo has been a target of 
sexualized distortion campaigns, including those 
accusing her of a sexual relationship with a married 
lawmaker, her hairdresser, and two government 
officials.103 False news and social media stories 
about her “boyfriends” and a supposed pregnancy 
led her to create a series of Facebook videos 
addressing each false claim against her, debunking 
“them one by one”.104
Here we present an examination of some of the 
themes of counterspeech we saw most commonly. 
Counterspeech is a way to challenge or mock the 
stereotypes and the norms, to expose the hateful 
comments, to call out gendered disinformation, 
or sometimes a way to speak up. In the 
Philippines dataset, 1,241 tweets were identified 
as counterspeech (with a broad understanding 
of counterspeech as speech which called out or 
criticised violence against women, whether online 
or offline). The majority of counterspeech in the 
Philippines dataset occured around discussions of 
“rape” but it was not limited to it. Tweets identified 
as counterspeech also challenged the gendered 
disinformation of Duterte critics or speech against 
LGBT people. 
One of the most common themes was challenging 
the normalisation of culture of rape. There were 
many tweets criticising the response to rape and 
how common it is in the society they live in. The 
tweets both aimed to draw attention to what is 
not acceptable and how to change it. In August 
2018, President Duterte made a comment saying 
rape is inevitable as long as there were beautiful 
women.105 His comment led to large amounts of 
criticism online. Many original seed users we looked 
at tweeted against his comment asking him to stop 
trivialising rape. These tweets also drew attention 
to the language in reproducing violence. Many of 
the tweets also refused the idea that introducing 
harsher penalty to rape or sexual harrassment 
cases will solve the problem without changing the 
language and culture of rape. 
Sexist words aren’t harmless.  They enable 
rape and the culture of sexual harassment.  
Always, we must stand against this and call 
out the patriarchy every time that it rears 
its ugly head.  If we remain silent, we are 
complicit.
‘Women are not passive victims of 
gendered disinformation and harassment 
- they are fighting back against it, and 
have many allies in that fight.’
103.  Cepeda, M. Here’s how Robredo debunks “fake news” vs her. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://rappler.com/nation/leni-robredo-debunks-fake-
news [accessed 30 July 20]
104.  Cepeda, M. Here’s how Robredo debunks “fake news” vs her. Rappler, 2018. Available at https://rappler.com/nation/leni-robredo-debunks-fake-
news [accessed 30 July 20]
105. Filipe Villamor, Duterte Jokes About Rape, Again. Philippine Women Aren’t Laughing, The New York Times, 2018. Available at  https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/08/31/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-rape-joke.html [accessed 15 May 20]
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Another common theme in counterspeech was 
fighting against victim blaming. There were 
many tweets aiming to educate the audience on 
why women are not the ones to blame and the 
importance of consent. Counterspeech happened 
in the form of speaking against the accepted norms 
such as a girl should not be drunk or out at night. 
Many users also discussed what counts as sexual 
harrassment or rape. For instance, a tweet said 
taking photos of female classmates can not be 
acceptable or another said the following: 
A girl getting drunk isn’t an invitation to 
molest her. It is not an excuse, for anyone  
to take advantage of her.
Countering gendered disinformation was not only 
limited to discussions around rape. Some of the 
users speak against gendered insults to undermine 
people or ideas such as “bakla”, “presstitutes” 
and criticised the use of these terms by mocking or 
speaking up.
On the other hand, in some tweets, we saw an 
overlap between content which engaged in 
counterspeech- speaking against violence against 
women- while also pursuing the aims of gendered 
disinformation - invalidating women objecting 
to rape jokes. For instance, a tweet cited that 
preventing rape should be a priority rather than 
being concerned about rape jokes. 
Another example that appeared in our dataset, 
was that of Risa Hontiveros, the opposition Senator 
who was called a “thirsty slut” on Twitter after a 
photo of her was shared at a State of the Nation 
Address wearing a skirt.106 We found a handful of 
tweets from original seed users countering this 
attack, for example, claiming that those who were 
slutshaming were trying to “belittle or devalue 
her [...] not just as a woman but someone who has 
made a massive difference” through her role in 
government. However, these counter-attacks did 
not then circulate amongst the friends and followers 
of original users, suggesting that counterspeech 
did not necessarily have the same cut-through with 
wider networks. 
106.  Rappler. Risa Hontiveros, Twitter users fire back at slut-shaming netizen over SONA dress. Rappler, 2019. Available at https://www.rappler.com/
nation/236011-risa-hontiveros-twitter-users-fire-back-slut-shaming-netizen-sona-2019-dress [accessed 15 May 20]
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Gendered disinformation online does not occur 
in a vacuum. It is linked to what is happening in 
the news, what commentators are saying, what 
politicians are saying, and varies across platforms 
as user bases and platform features vary the kind of 
content that is most prominent. 
Our analysis centered on Twitter, as the most 
accessible platform for programmatically collecting 
large amounts of data from; however discourse 
on Twitter does not always represent political 
discourse as a whole in a country. For instance, in 
the Philippines, Facebook is a particularly relevant 
site of political discourse. Hence to get a better 
picture of the broader landscape, we examined 
URLs that were shared within tweets identified as 
being relevant to gendered disinformation.
In Poland, a considerable number of the users and 
followers were sharing content from media outlets 
considered mainstream or traditional, such as 
DoRzeczy, TVN24, wPolityce, Interia and Onet.107 A 
smaller number, though, were sharing news articles 
from more overtly partisan sites such as wPrawo, an 
online media site set up by the former priest and 
far-right activist that pushes nationalist and anti-
Ukrainian themes and Natemat, described  
as “a forum for left-wing and liberal commentators” 
against the ruling party PiS.108  
Outside of those sharing news outlets, tweets 
would share content from political campaigns, 
across the political spectrum. A further handful of 
tweets from friends and followers would directly 
troll women politicians and a smaller number still 
directly endorse them.
In the Philippines, content shared by original 
users consisted mainly of two approaches to 
disinformation: either sharing or endorsing 
mainstream news sites and social media news 
sites; or directly retweeting content that might 
be considered empowering with sexual distortion 
and hate speech to discredit and devalue it.  For 
example, when politician Leila De Lima received an 
award from the Financial Times for her worldwide 
influence, a pro-Duterte account shrugged this off 
by sexualising her role in politics as simply “just like 
masturbation, stock prices go up when Leila De 
Lima says saba”. 
A Facebook page, run by someone internationally 
recognised as a pro-Duterte proponent of 
gendered disinformation, was also regularly shared 
by users with content on key female figures such 
as Leila De Lima.109 The account owner has a social 
media presence as well as a media presence.
107.  Bush, D., Gielewska, A., and Kurzynski, M. Polish Presidential Election 2020: Two Months Out, Stanford Internet Observatory, 2020. Available at  
https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/polish-elections-2-months-out [accessed 14 April 2020]
108.  Eurotopics.net. Natemat. Available at https://www.eurotopics.net/en/148727/natemat [accessed 14 April 2020]
109.  Etter, L. What Happens When the Government Uses Facebook as a Weapon?, Bloomberg Businessweek, 2017. Available at  
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-07/how-rodrigo-duterte-turned-facebook-into-a-weapon-with-a-little-help-from-facebook 
[accessed 13 April 20]
‘Gendered disinformation online 
does not occur in a vacuum.‘
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A minority of the content shared by original users 
was to counter gendered disinformation, including 
the targets themselves sharing content e.g. about 
Duterte “slut-shaming” them.  
In the Philippines, the shared content from the 
friends and followers of the original users echoed 
that of the original users. The content shared by 
friends and followers in particular included a variety 
of news sites and Facebook pages that were overtly 
partisan.
These links being shared between Facebook and 
mainstream news sites on Twitter suggest that what 
is happening on Twitter is indeed linked into and 
can be used to obtain a snapshot, even though not 
a full representation, of the broader disinformation 
ecosystem.110 
110.  Zeiter, K., Pepera, S., and Middlehurst, M. Tweets That Chill: Analyzing Online Violence Against Women in Politics. National Democratic Institute, 
2019. Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Tweets%20That%20Chill%20Report.pdf [accessed 03 May 20]
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, what are the aims and methods  
of state-aligned gendered disinformation, and  
what does this mean for the targets, for politics  
and for policy?
These rules, used together, build up a toxic 
environment online where, if women dare to enter, 
they are abused, undermined, threatened, gaslit, 
delegitimised, and insulted. Not only can this cause 
serious harm for individuals involved, but creates 
a public sphere in which women are not free to 
express themselves, or to participate in politics, or 
to speak up against injustice and oppression. These 
stories have important commonalities in how they 
seek to attack and undermine women in public 
life. We conclude by outlining strategies which bad 
actors are employing to promote political outcomes 
through the manipulation of gendered norms.
THEY USE EMOTIONS, NOT FACTS
The clearest commonality between the stories told 
about women in public life described above is that 
they seek to inflame people’s emotions, in addition 
to spreading false information about their targets. 
While this includes false information, the content 
of the messages is clearly not only seeking to 
make assertions but to anger those reading it - by 
playing on highly emotive, value-based concepts 
such as loyalty, honesty, purity; or to persuade 
them to dismiss someone as laughable by painting 
them as stupid, weak and emotional. Fear is also 
weaponised - fear of violence, fear of mysterious 
conspiracies,or even fear of their own safety  - in 
order to emotionally manipulate readers.
THEY TARGET WOMEN, CONVERT THEIR 
ALLIES, BOLSTER THEIR CRITICS
Online discussions criticising women in public life in 
the ways set out above also have two targets. One 
is the woman herself - tweets which either directly 
tag their Twitter handle and address them, or which 
speak in the second person when discussing them. 
Other discussions are speaking either to other 
parties about their targets; expressing an opinion 
generally; supporting their critics or attacking their 
supporters, by presenting gendered reasons why 
women should not be believed or trusted to lead. 
The messages work to engender anger, disgust 
and disdain in the third party reader; and fear and 
shame in the second person target.
THEY USE IN-JOKES
Specific phrases or terms are used in online 
discourse by communities engaging in SAGD to 
denigrate a particular woman or make reference to 
a particular event, which might not be immediately 
obvious to an outside observer. For instance, 
many tweets attacking Senator Leila de Lima did 
not mention her by name (and so would not be 
found if looking through tweets about her by name 
alone) but used the term “saba queen” instead 
(referencing the rumours about her having an affair). 
These in-group usages mean that it is easier to 
identify who is ‘on your side’ and to find other like-
minded people in a formal or informal network who 
are likely to support your aims. Hashtags are also 
used to similar effect. 
THEY MAKE THE NEWS - THEN USE THE NEWS 
We saw online discussion around notable instances 
of gendered disinformation - abuse or offensive 
‘These rules, used together, 
build up a toxic environment 
online where, if women dare 
to enter, they are abused, 
undermined, threatened, gaslit, 
delegitimised, and insulted.’
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comments made by political leaders, which then 
became a discussion point in themselves which led 
to repetition online, including in mainstream media  
THEY ARE PARASITIC 
We saw gendered disinformation and terms 
relevant being used to reinforce social norms and 
gender stereotypes against critics and supporters 
of the state. This shows that disinformation relies 
on co-opting underlying values, beliefs and ways 
of speaking to get its message across, rather 
than trying to invent something completely new, 
which can then result in methods of disinformation 
spreading more widely and being used against 
people beyond the original targets.
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CHAPTER 8  
RECLAIMING  
THE GAME
In this report we present a methodology which 
can be used to identify where state-aligned 
gendered disinformation is occurring in an online 
environment, and what forms it takes and purposes 
it aims to serve. 
To challenge the harms that are caused by state-
aligned gendered disinformation, we need 
platforms, policymakers and civil society to 
recognise that gendered disinformation exists as 
a specific form of gendered online violence and 
of disinformation, which requires its own tailored 
interventions.
This is not to say that nothing is being done. As 
we have demonstrated in this report, women 
are speaking up against these campaigns, and 
politicians, journalists and activists are continuing to 
do their vital work in spite of these efforts to stop 
them. However, the onus should not be on women 
who are being targeted in these campaigns to 
deal with it themselves. Being able to put up with 
coordinated campaigns of hatred, abuse, lies and 
misogyny should not be a requirement for being a 
woman in public life. 
It is of course crucial that users are given the 
controls on the platforms they engage in to block 
or report users or content, or to limit visibility 
of or engagement with their own content, or to 
delete their accounts - all of which women use to 
respond to online violence. Moreover, platforms 
must actually follow through in responding to such 
reports.111 There is more work that can be done 
to enforce this, from ensuring the enforcement of 
terms of service to making reporting mechanisms 
more transparent, easy to use and accountable.112  
But assuming that women will deal with the 
problem themselves, on a comment-by-comment 
basis overlooks the systematic effects of gendered 
disinformation, as well as putting an unfair burden 
on women who are not only being targeted for 
what they say, but as we have shown, also for 
responding to or blocking people on the basis of 
gendered disinformation. 
We need systematic improvements to be made to 
how platforms operate in facilitating, promoting 
and moderating online speech, and how policy and 
practice respond to these problems. We present 
here the challenges of existing solutions to these 
problems, and criteria that effective solutions 
must meet. Thanks must go to the participants of 
a closed roundtable held by NDI to discuss these 
issues in helping inform these recommendations. 
RECOGNISE THE DIVERSITY OF 
DISINFORMATION
Disinformation takes many forms and is engaged 
in and perpetuated by many different actors: a 
‘one-size fits-all’ approach will not be successful. 
Locating the harm of gendered disinformation 
as inherent in the fact that what is being said 
is untrue is to misunderstand the violent and 
prejudicial elements of what is being said. Hence 
fact-checking, while important in the fight against 
‘Identifying or mitigating gendered 
disinformation cannot be successful 
without the central involvement and 
direction of local experts.‘
111.  Iyer, N., Nyamwire, B., and Nabulega, S. Alternate Realities, Alternate Internets. Pollicy, 2020. Available at https://ogbv.pollicy.org/report.pdf 
[accessed 24 August 2020]
112.  Thanks to participants at a closed roundtable with NDI for making this point. August 2020. 
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disinformation, is not a panacea, particularly 
where the claims being made are couched in value 
judgements or are about people’s character. 
Similarly, there is a spectrum of disinformation: 
from the huge, clearly identifiable campaigns 
involving clearly inauthentic accounts, down to 
low-scale attacks from a small group of like-minded 
individuals. Focusing on dealing with the problem 
at both of these ends as the easiest to identify and 
act on will miss engaging with the problem of the 
informal networks we have shown are implicated in 
gendered disinformation: the political influencers 
and their followings. 
NOT JUST A ‘GENDER’ PROBLEM
Steps should be taken to tackling gendered 
disinformation within broader programmes of 
work to reduce gender inequality, reduce gender-
based violence, and promote equal democratic 
participation. However, tackling gendered 
disinformation should not be the sole purview of 
gender-based programming: broader responses to 
online harms, analysis of information operations, 
or improvements to platform design and oversight, 
should take into account the ramifications for 
the spread or encouragement of gendered 
disinformation. 
CENTRE LOCAL EXPERTISE 
This report has shown that though the narratives 
perpetuated may be similar, how gendered 
disinformation is framed and spreads across 
a network varies greatly according to context. 
Identifying or mitigating gendered disinformation 
cannot be successful without the central 
involvement and direction of local experts  
who understand the subtleties of how gendered 
disinformation may be expressed and where it  
is likely to arise and when. Platforms should  
support the work of local experts in identifying  
and combating gendered disinformation, for 
instance through the provision of data access or  
the trialling of potential responses through changes 
to platform design. Automated systems for 
identifying gendered disinformation are unlikely to 
have high levels of accuracy - though if employed, 
should be employed transparently and overseen  
by local experts. 
ELEVATE WOMEN’S VOICES
Solutions to gendered disinformation will not 
succeed if they are imposed upon the women 
who are being most affected: indeed, it is these 
women who have experienced the positives and 
negatives of existing solutions most significantly. 
Solutions should be co-created with people who 
have experienced being the targets of gendered 
disinformation, to ensure that the most significant 
threats are being addressed in a way that does not 
compound the problem. Metrics of success used 
should be rooted in how positive and empowering 
spaces for women to participate in have been built, 
rather than simply how much bad content has been 
taken down.113 
113. See e.g.  Iyer, N., Nyamwire, B., and Nabulega, S. Alternate Realities, Alternate Internets. Pollicy, 2020.  
Available at https://ogbv.pollicy.org/report.pdf [accessed 24 August 2020]
‘Solutions to gendered 
disinformation will not 
succeed if they are imposed 
upon the women who are 
being most affected.’
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